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This thesis examines the dilemma of Ukrainian integration into Europe and 
analyzes the significance and prospect of Ukrainian membership in NATO following the 
2004 “Orange Revolution.”  The extraordinary election of Victor Yushchenko became a 
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may fulfill the necessary conditions for NATO accession in the coming years.  However, 
the notion of NATO membership is still unpopular among Ukrainians, and anti-NATO 
influence in Ukraine remains significant.  The onus remains on Ukraine to take the 
actions needed to join the Euro-Atlantic and European communities, and long-term 
































THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii





A. INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE ..............................................................1 
B. IMPORTANCE AND METHODOLOGY....................................................2 
II. THE ORANGE REVOLUTION AND THE (RE)EMERGING UKRAINIAN 
DILEMMA ...................................................................................................................5 
A. INTRODUCTION............................................................................................5 
B.  “THE GEOPOLITICAL PIVOT” .................................................................5 
1.  Eurasian Connections..........................................................................6 
2. European Ukraine..............................................................................10 
3. The Early Dilemma............................................................................11 
C. THE ORANGE REVOLUTION ..................................................................12 
1. The Elections ......................................................................................13 
2.  The Birth of the “Revolution” ..........................................................14 
3. Significance of the Orange Revolution.............................................15 
D. THE EUROPEAN UNION ...........................................................................17 
1. The EU-Ukraine Relationship ..........................................................17 
2. Enlargement Difficulties....................................................................19 
3. After the Revolution ..........................................................................20 
E.  CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................22 
III. THE NATO QUESTION ..........................................................................................25 
A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................25 
B. THE COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIP...................................................25 
1. Rediscovering the West .....................................................................26 
2. Eastern Regression?...........................................................................30 
3. From Cooperation to Ukraine Fatigue ............................................32 
4. The Political Catalyst.........................................................................35 
C. UKRAINIAN LEVERAGE...........................................................................36 
1. Strategic Airlift...................................................................................36 
2. Setbacks ..............................................................................................38 
D. THE DEMOCRATIC EMBRACE ..............................................................40 
1. NATO Literature ...............................................................................40 
2. Ukraine’s Champions ........................................................................42 
a. The United States ....................................................................42 
b. Poland......................................................................................45 
E. SINCE THE REVOLUTION .......................................................................47 
1. Intensified Dialogue ...........................................................................47 
2. Membership Action Plan?.................................................................48 
F. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................51 




1. The Black Sea Fleet............................................................................54 
2. Single Economic Space ......................................................................55 
3. Energy .................................................................................................55 
C. PUBLIC OPINION........................................................................................56 
D. LOSING MOMENTUM? .............................................................................58 
E. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................59 
V. CONCLUSIONS ........................................................................................................61 
A. THE NEW DILEMMA .................................................................................61 
B. THE WAY AHEAD.......................................................................................62 
1. Ukraine................................................................................................62 
2. NATO..................................................................................................63 
3. The European Union .........................................................................64 
BIBLIOGRAPHY..................................................................................................................65 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .........................................................................................75 
 
 ix




Table 1. Comparison of Strategic Airlift Assets ............................................................37 
Table 2. Comparison of Freedom House Ratings ..........................................................49 
Table 3. Comparison of Corruption Ratings..................................................................50 
Table 4. Comparison of GDP.........................................................................................50 





























First, I would like to thank the entire staff and faculty of the National Security 
Affairs Department at the Naval Postgraduate School for my first-rate academic 
experience. I especially want to thank my thesis advisors Professor Mikhail Tsypkin and 
Colonel Hans-Eberhard Peters for their expert input, frank discussions, and enduring 
patience.  Professor Tsypkin’s knowledge of Russia and the former Soviet Republics was 
invaluable in cultivating my understanding of Eastern Europe and Eurasia.  I always 
enjoyed hearing his candid insights.  Colonel Peters imparted his extensive wisdom about 
European security institutions and Europe as a whole.  His perspectives have made me 
much more appreciative of the European and Euro-Atlantic communities. 
Most of all, I want like to thank my very loving (and very pregnant) wife Beckie 
for all of her patience and support during this project.  I am truly blessed to have her in 























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE 
On January 23, 2005, Victor Yushchenko delivered his inaugural Presidential 
address to the Ukrainian people in Kyiv’s Independence Square.  His investiture followed 
a contentious campaign and election that ultimately led to the “Orange Revolution,” in 
which hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians mobilized on the streets of Kyiv to protest the 
results of the 2004 presidential runoff election.  Prime Minister Victor Yanukovich was 
initially declared the winner of the November vote, but due to widespread allegations of 
voter intimidation and election fraud, Yushchenko officially disputed the results of the 
election.  Based on credible evidence of fraud and the dramatic public uprising, the 
Ukrainian Supreme Court nullified the results of the November vote, and Yushchenko 
won the court ordered revote on December 26, 2004.1 
During his inaugural address, President Yushchenko declared his goal of 
“Ukraine in a United Europe.”2  Previous attempts to incorporate Ukraine into Western 
structures lacked the requisite political commitment, but as a result of the Orange 
Revolution and the subsequent election of Yushchenko, efforts to integrate Ukraine into 
European and Euro-Atlantic political, economic, and security institutions gained 
considerable momentum.  President Yushchenko outlined vigorous domestic reform 
plans and traveled to Europe in order to lobby formally for both European Union (EU) 
and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) membership consideration.   
As the Orange Revolution approaches its first anniversary, what are the prognoses 
for these aspirations?  Despite the initial fervor, this thesis outlines the emerging 
predicament that may hinder Ukrainian integration into European and Euro-Atlantic 
structures.  First, Ukraine cannot discard the innate diplomatic, economic, and social ties 
to Russia.  Tellingly, Yushchenko’s first foreign trip as President was to Moscow to meet 
with Russian President Vladimir Putin and Yushchenko has referred to Russia as 
                                                 
1 Steven Woehrel, CRS Report for Congress: Ukraine’s Political Crisis and U.S. Policy Issues. 
(Washington, DC: Library of Congress),  01 February 2005, RL32691, 7-8. 
2 “Quotes of the Week,” RFE/RL Belarus and Ukraine Report 7, no. 4 (26 January 2005). 
2 
Ukraine’s “eternal strategic partner.”3  Second, it has become clear that Ukraine’s 
ultimate goal of accession into the EU remains improbable due to years of reform efforts 
in Ukraine that amounted only to rhetoric, coupled with expansion issues within the EU.  
Though the European Union supports the new government and has upgraded its bilateral 
relationship with Ukraine, the EU has yet to acknowledge an official “open door policy” 
towards Ukraine or establish a timeline for accession talks.   
On the other hand, NATO supports the renewed integration aspirations resulting 
from the Orange Revolution.  Despite periods of political discord, Ukraine and NATO 
share an impressive history of military cooperation, and Ukrainian assets augment critical 
NATO capability shortfalls.  President Yushchenko even elucidated his priority for 
Ukraine: “It is only logical that we target our efforts toward the integration into NATO.”4  
Consequently, the Ukrainian path into Europe starts with NATO, and this thesis 
specifically examines the NATO-Ukraine relationship and analyzes the prospects of 
Ukrainian membership in NATO.   
B. IMPORTANCE AND METHODOLOGY 
This thesis is relevant for two primary reasons.  First, it examines the complex 
geopolitical and strategic relationships that exist in Ukraine.  The widespread 
international interest in the 2004 Ukrainian presidential election underscored the 
important geopolitical and strategic role of Ukraine in Europe and Eurasia.  Due to its 
eclectic borders, Ukraine walks a geopolitical “tightrope” between Western and Eastern 
interests, and the Orange Revolution only amplified these dynamics.5  Although 
Ukrainian relations with NATO are not novel, Russia opposes formal Ukrainian 
membership in Western security institutions and NATO accession would dramatically 
alter the geopolitical and strategic maps of Europe and Eurasia.  
Second, both NATO and the EU continue to conduct enlargement debates and 
both institutions impart specific requirements and considerations for membership.  This 
                                                 
3 “Kyiv Remains Wary of ‘Deeper’ Integration with Moscow,” RFE/RL Newsline 9, no. 34 (22 
February 2005). 
4 Ukraine’s Yushchenko Addresses Joint Session of U.S. Congress, April 6, 2005, http:// 
usinfo.state.gov/usino/Archive/2005/Apr/06-111471.html (accessed 20 August 2005). 
5  Alexander J. Motyl, “Ukraine, Europe, and Russia: Exclusion or Dependence?” in Ambivalent 
Neighbors: The EU, NATO, and the Price of Membership, ed. Anatol Lieven and Dmitri Trenin 
(Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003), 28. 
3 
thesis identifies these requirements and analyzes the likelihood of Ukrainian integration 
in these terms.  Moreover, this thesis identifies areas of leverage like location, strategic 
airlift, and weapon nonproliferation that bolster Ukrainian integration efforts into 
European and Euro-Atlantic institutions.  
This thesis uses primary and secondary sources that examine the dynamics of the 
Orange Revolution, Ukrainian geopolitics, Russia, the EU, and NATO enlargement.  
Primary sources include official speeches, NATO and EU documentation, and formal 
legislation.  Secondary sources include journals, databases, and published literature that 
focus on Ukrainian reform efforts, former Soviet relations in Eastern Europe, and NATO 
and EU enlargement.   
Chapter II examines the geopolitical importance of Ukraine, the significance of 
the Orange Revolution, and the emerging dilemma of European integration.  Ukraine and 
Russia share deep structural roots that date back many centuries, and Russia has long 
viewed Ukraine as a “little brother.”  However, Ukraine quickly pursued its own 
relationships with the West after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.  The Orange 
Revolution served as a catalyst for European and Euro-Atlantic integration, which 
ultimately amplified the geopolitical and strategic dilemma for Ukraine.  The EU presents 
Ukraine with a novel set of political, economic, and implied security guarantees, but 
membership requirements for the EU are extensive and years of rhetorical cooperation 
with the EU damaged the chances of Ukrainian integration with the EU.  Additionally, 
disagreements about continued EU enlargement and the rejection of the European 
Constitution will further hamper Ukraine’s chances for membership.  As a result, 
Ukrainian short-term aspirations for integration hinge on NATO. 
Chapter III examines Ukraine’s relationship with NATO.  This relationship has 
proven to be very successful, and cooperation between Ukraine and NATO occurred 
fairly quickly after the fall of the Soviet Union.  The dismantling of the Ukrainian nuclear 
arsenal led to implicit security guarantees from the West – specifically the United States.  
The Orange Revolution coupled with Ukrainian cooperation with NATO has led to an 
Intensified Dialogue with NATO; however, many issues still remain unresolved.  Ukraine 
offers NATO vital strategic airlift capability and prime geopolitical airspace and location 
4 
for fighting the GWOT and implementing the terms of NATO’s 2002 Prague Capabilities 
Commitment, which outlined critical Alliance shortfalls.  Most importantly, the 
democratic revolution elicits a response from the Alliance founded on the principles of 
democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law, and the United States and Poland 
strongly support Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations.  However, there are still significant 
obstacles for Ukraine.   
Chapter IV discusses these obstacles for NATO accession.  NATO accession is 
still unpopular among Ukrainians, and an influential Russia remains unsupportive of 
Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic security ambitions.  In addition, the “Revolution” is losing 
critical momentum, and Ukraine must still commit to difficult reforms before it is 
prepared for accession talks for NATO.  
Chapter V is the conclusion in which this thesis reiterates the significance of the 
Orange Revolution on long-term European and Euro-Atlantic integration and recaps the 
dilemma that Ukraine must overcome.  Ukraine still has some very critical and 
encumbering obstacles to address, and the possibility for integration depend on Ukrainian 
actions during the coming year.  This chapter concludes with some suggestions to help 
Ukraine emerge from its European dilemma. 
5 
II. THE ORANGE REVOLUTION AND THE (RE)EMERGING 
UKRAINIAN DILEMMA 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter has three purposes.  First, this chapter explains the geopolitical 
significance of Ukraine for both Europe and Eurasia.  The evidence shows that the 
structural connections between Ukraine and Russia are abundant, but Ukraine quickly 
expanded its policy to pursue European and Euro-Atlantic options shortly after its 1991 
independence.  Second, this chapter examines the far-reaching significance of the 2004 
Ukrainian presidential election.  The “Orange Revolution” and ensuing election of Victor 
Yushchenko bolstered Ukraine’s European and Euro-Atlantic aspirations and amplified 
the geopolitical predicament.  Lastly, this chapter explains that despite the democratic 
gains and renewed efforts in Ukraine, European Union (EU) membership is simply not a 
near-term possibility due to strict accession requirements and enlargement debates inside 
the EU.  Consequently, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has emerged as 
the first logical step of Western integration. 
B.  “THE GEOPOLITICAL PIVOT” 
Before examining the specific events of the 2004 Presidential election, it is 
important to explore the question: why is Ukraine so important to the Great Powers?  
Strategically located at the “crossroads between Europe and Asia,” Ukraine plays an 
integral role in both regional and inter-continental stability.6  On the one hand, as a 
former republic of the Soviet Union with ties to the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS), Ukraine appears to lie within the Russian “near abroad” sphere of influence.  
On the other hand, Ukraine is formally a European country, and Western political 
institutions like the EU and NATO have established meaningful relationships with 
Ukraine.  Located in the geographic center of Europe, Ukraine is the second largest 
country in Europe with an area of 603,700 square kilometers (slightly smaller than the 
state of Texas) and robust national security considerations.  Ukraine is situated between 
Russia to the east; Poland, Moldova, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia to the west; 
                                                 
6 Central Intelligence Agency, “CIA World Factbook: Ukraine,” http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/ 
factbook/geos/up.html (accessed 30 August 2005). 
6 
Belarus to the north; and the Black Sea to the south.7  In fact, the literal English 
translation of the word “Ukraine” is “borderland.”8  Because of these diverse borders and 
influences, Ukraine has been called the “keystone in the arch” for Central and Eastern 
European security.9  Zbigniew Brzezinski has labeled Ukraine as one of the five 
“geopolitical pivots” in the world based on its “sensitive location” and “vulnerable 
position” in relation to the formidable powers in Europe and Eurasia.10  As a result, any 
significant policy shift of Ukraine could dramatically alter the geopolitical and strategic 
map of Central and Eastern Europe, which, in turn, could affect the security environments 
in Asia, Europe, and even North America.   
1.  Eurasian Connections 
To the East, Ukraine represents the remnants of the evaporating Russian Empire.  
Brzezinski even argues that an independent Ukraine almost single-handedly prevents 
Russia from reemerging as a Eurasian empire.11  Though Russia ruled over most of 
Ukraine nearly continuously for over 300 years, the two countries share a history of 
Slavic heritage that spans much longer.  Kiev (now commonly spelled “Kyiv”) was the 
historical center of the Eastern Slavic region called Kievan Rus – the “ancient area of 
Slavdom, the cradle of the Russian Orthodoxy, and the symbol of Byzantine succession.”  
Although some Ukrainian nationalists and historians argue that the Ukrainians are from 
“Rus” and the Russians are latecomers from Scandinavian “Ros,” it is generally accepted 
that the Ukrainians, Belorussians, and Russians all came from Kievan Rus.  Mongols 
sacked Kiev in 1240, and Moscovy (Moscow) emerged in the fifteenth century as the 
new geopolitical center for the Eastern Slavs.12   
The Russian Empire gained control over much of present-day Ukraine following 
the 1654 Treaty of Pereiaslav, and Russia acquired more of Ukraine after the second and 
                                                 
7 CIA World Factbook: Ukraine. 
8 Mikhail A. Molchanov, Political Culture and National Identity in Russian-Ukrainian Relations 
(College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2002), 111. 
9 Sherman W. Garnett, Keystone in the Arch: Ukraine in the Emerging Security Environment of 
Central and Eastern Europe (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1997), 7.  
10 Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives 
(New York: Basic Books, 1997), 40-41. 
11  Brzezinski, 46. 
12 Molchanov, 59-62, 112; and Anatol Lieven, Ukraine & Russia: A Fraternal Rivalry (Washington, 
DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999), 11-16. 
7 
third partitions of Poland in 1793 and 1795.  Not surprisingly, Russian nationalists saw 
the treaty as a voluntary Slavic reunion, while some Ukrainian nationalists viewed it as 
an annexation.13  Consequently, Russia has long viewed Ukraine as a “little brother,” and 
one high-ranking Russian diplomat even publicly referred to an independent Ukraine as 
“temporarily lost territory.”14   
Christianity emerged in Rus around 988 A.D., and both Ukraine and Russia are 
primarily Orthodox Christian states.  Within the Eastern Orthodoxy, there are two major 
patriarchates – Kiev and Moscow.  Of the 46 percent of Orthodox Ukrainians, nine-
percent still follow the Moscow Patriarchate.  Approximately six percent of the 
population still recognizes the Pope due to Polish and Lithuanian influence that emerged 
in Ukraine after the fall of Kievan Rus.  In addition to the Christian population, both 
Russia and Ukraine have relatively small but vocal groups of Muslims.15  Along this 
theme, Samuel Huntington draws the modern day “fault line” for future world conflict 
between Western Christianity, Orthodox Christianity, and Islam just inside the western 
border of Ukraine.  Interestingly, Huntington’s model connects Russia and Ukraine 
ideologically against the West in the next stage of world conflict.16   
Ukraine first emerged as an independent state in 1917, but was consolidated under 
Russian control again in October 1920 and officially became a Soviet Republic in 1922.17  
During the Soviet era, Ukraine played vital roles in the Soviet political, economic, and 
security systems.  Due to its fertile land and favorable climate, Ukraine came to represent 
the “breadbasket” of the Soviet Union.  Ukraine produced more than a fourth of the 
agricultural output of the Soviet Union, provided numerous raw materials, and housed a 
large portion of the Soviet military and heavy industry.  Ukraine also encompassed 
crucial geopolitical and strategic space for the Soviet Union during the Second World 
                                                 
13 Molchanov, 67. 
14 “Ukrainians Worry Serb Win Augurs Conflict with Russia,” Christian Science Monitor, 26 (May  
1993); and Paul Kubicek, “Russian Foreign Policy and the West,” Political Science Quarterly 114, no. 4 
(Winter, 1999-2000), 557. 
15 CIA World Fact Book: Ukraine. 
16 Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York, 
NY: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 159, 163-168. 
17 Lieven, Ukraine and Russia, 28-29. 
8 
War and the subsequent Cold War with the West.  Therefore, it is no surprise that 
Ukraine’s 1991 defection was a key factor in the collapse of the Soviet Union.   
Under the leadership of Leonid Kravchuk, the Verkhovna Rada (Ukrainian 
Parliament) declared its independence from the Soviet Union on August 24, 1991, just 
days after the failed coup-de-tat against the Soviet leadership in Moscow.  Ukraine 
followed the declaration with a national referendum on December 1, 1991, in which 90 
percent of Ukrainians voted to support independence.  Eight days later, leaders from 
Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus annulled the 1922 treaty that established the Soviet Union, 
and the Union officially dissolved on December 25, 1991.18   
Due in part to its large common border, structural commonalities, and Slavic 
heritage with Russia, the obvious choice for Ukrainian security and policy allegiance 
after the fall of the Soviet Union was with Russia and the newly formed CIS, which 
provided political ties and implicit security guarantees without the despotism of the 
Soviet Union.  In addition, Ukraine remained strategically essential for Russian security 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union for at least three major reasons:  First, Poland 
quickly embraced a European integration strategy.  In the spirit of Yalta, Ukraine served 
as the new buffer between Europe and Russia.19  Second, Ukraine still housed large 
numbers of former-Soviet troops and equipment, including over 4,400 nuclear weapons 
from the arsenal.20  Though Ukraine did not gain positive control of these nuclear 
weapons, it could have feasibly disrupted their use.  Third, Ukraine inherited Sevastopol, 
the homeport for the former Soviet Navy’s Black Sea Fleet (BSF).   
The issue of the BSF inflamed what Leonid Kuchma, President of Ukraine from 
1994 until 2005, termed the “divorce syndrome.”21  Ukraine was not immediately willing 
to turn control of the fleet back over to Russia following the collapse of the USSR.  In 
response, the Russian Duma (Parliament) repeatedly challenged the legitimacy of Nikita 
                                                 
18 Andrew Wilson, The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation (New Haven, CT: Yale Nota Bene, 2002), 
169-171. 
19 Taras Kuzio, Ukrainian Security Policy (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1995), 58. 
20 Leonid I. Polyakov, U.S.-Ukraine Military Relations and the Value of Interoperability (Carlisle, PA: 
U.S. Army War College, 2004), 7. 
21 Roman Solchanyk, “Ukraine, Russia, and the CIS,” in Ukraine in the World: Studies in the 
International Relations and Security Structure of a Newly Independent State, ed. Lubomyr A. Hajda, 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), 20. 
9 
Khrushchev’s 1954 decision to transfer administrative control of the Crimean Peninsula 
(including the port of Sevastopol) over to Ukraine from Russia in order to commemorate 
the three hundredth anniversary of the Treaty of Pereiaslav.22  The first makeshift 
agreement over the fleet would not occur until 1994, but dissent over Crimea and the BSF 
was so strong that the issue was not formally resolved until the “Friendship, Cooperation, 
and Partnership” between Russia and Ukraine was inked on May 31, 1997 – nearly six 
years after the collapse of the USSR.23  Under the agreement, Russia recognized 
Ukrainian control of Sevastopol, and Ukraine agreed to lease the port back to Russia in 
order to house the Russian BSF until 2017 for approximately $100 million a year.  In 
addition, Ukraine sold most of its half of the BSF back to Russia to pay off some of its 
substantial energy debt to Russia.24  
Despite the Soviet collapse, Russia and Ukraine still have enduring social 
connections.  Over 17 percent of the 50 million residents of Ukraine during the 2001 
census were ethnic Russians, and 24 percent of Ukrainians were Russophones who still 
spoke Russian as their primary language.  Economically, Russia remains Ukraine’s single 
largest trading partner state, accounting for nearly 32 percent of Ukraine’s exports and 17 
percent of its imports.  In addition, Russia provides 85 percent of Ukrainian energy 
resources.  The two countries still participate in many joint economic endeavors and in 
2004 the Verkhovna Rada ratified the CIS “Single Economic Space” (SES) agreement 
between Ukraine, Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, which created an economic union 
between these four states.25  
In spite of the numerous political, economic, and social ties that bound Russia and 
Ukraine together in the wake of the Soviet collapse, Ukraine has made it clear that 
allegiance to Moscow is not its only foreign policy and security option.  By 1994, 
Ukraine brokered its own Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with the EU 
and became the first state in the CIS to sign a Partnership for Peace (PfP) agreement with 
                                                 
22 F. Stephen Larrabee, NATO’s Eastern Agenda in a New Strategic Era (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 
2003), 90. 
23 Solchanyk, 19, 34-39.  
24 Lieven, Ukraine and Russia, 128-129. 
25 CIA World Factbook: Ukraine; and “Moscow Steps In to Check Kyiv’s European Drive,” RFE/RL 
Belarus and Ukraine Report 7, no. 8 (23 February 2005). 
10 
NATO.  More significantly, Ukraine did not join the Commonwealth’s Collective 
Security Organization after it failed to sign the Tashkent Treaty in May 1992, and 
Ukraine remains a mere “partner” (not a de jure member) in the Moscow-centric CIS 
because the Verkhovna Rada  declined to ratify the 1993 CIS Charter.26 
2. European Ukraine 
To the West, Ukraine is emerging as an important geopolitical part of “New 
Europe.”  Ukraine currently borders three EU member states (Poland, Slovakia, and 
Hungary), and Romania is expected to accede in 2007 or 2008.27  At present, the EU is 
primarily an economic and political union, but the growing aspects of the Common 
Foreign Security Policy (CFSP), European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP), and 
robust EU border control requirements present security guarantees and may impair future 
Ukrainian interaction with critical border states (especially Poland) that reside in the 
EU.28  Economically, Ukraine has one of the fastest growing economies in Europe, and 
collective trade with the 25 EU member states exceeds Ukrainian trade with Russia by 
nearly $5 billion.29  Ukraine also plays a significant role in EU security and 
transportation considerations.  In the words of Javier Solana, the EU High Representative 
for the CFSP, “Ukraine’s size, its large and well-educated population, its rich natural 
resources and important geographical location make her a partner of strategic importance 
for the EU.”30 
Hypothetical Ukrainian accession into the EU would require Ukraine to secure the 
long borders with Russia and Belarus, though the EU already shares borders with both 
mainland Russia (Latvia, Estonia, and Finland) and Belarus (Poland, Lithuania, and 
Latvia).  More importantly, Russia does not overtly oppose Ukrainian efforts to integrate 
into the EU.   
                                                 
26 Taras Kuzio, EU and Ukraine: A Turning Point in 2004? (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, 
2003), 10; and Tor Bukkvoll, Ukraine and European Security (London: Pinter, 1997), 64. 
27 Mark Beunderman, “Brussels Threatens Bulgaria and Romania with Entry Delay,” EUObserver, 25 
October 2005. 
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For NATO, Ukrainian sovereignty, territorial integrity, democratic development, 
and economic prosperity are four of the “key factors of stability and security in central 
and eastern Europe and in Europe as a whole.”31  Previous rounds of NATO enlargement 
have extended the Euro-Atlantic borders to western Ukraine, and four NATO states 
(Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania) now share a common border with Ukraine.  
Ukrainian independence bolsters the security of these NATO countries to its west by 
limiting and separating Russian influence to its east.  Unlike Russia, Ukraine does not 
view NATO as a threat to its security, and Ukraine never officially opposed the notion of 
NATO expansion into Central and Eastern Europe.32  As NATO continues to expand, the 
question of “strategic position” remains an important issue for prospective members.33  
Though hypothetical Ukrainian accession would take NATO deep into former Soviet 
territory against the interests of Russia, the Ukrainian geopolitical position near the 
crossroads of Greater Europe, Eurasia, and the Middle East remains strategically 
beneficial for NATO power projection and global reach missions in the new era of 
asymmetric warfare and the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). 
3. The Early Dilemma 
Shortly after its independence in 1991, Ukraine started walking a geopolitical 
“tightrope” between these Eastern and Western interests, and the competing influences 
ultimately fashioned a geopolitical dilemma for Ukraine.34  As Ukraine pursued 
improved relationships with European and Euro-Atlantic institutions, Russian influence 
in Ukraine often affected the negotiations or stalled domestic reform efforts.  On the 
other hand, without these relationships with the West, Russia could essentially dominate 
Ukraine.  In response, Ukraine developed a “multi-vector” approach to foreign policy in 
order to balance out these competing interests.35  However, this non-aligned “multi-
vectorism” often translated into rhetorical promises or a lack of political commitment 
with NATO and the EU.  Even after Ukraine officially abandoned its multi-vector policy 
                                                 
31 North Atlantic Council, The Alliance’s Strategic Concept, NAC-S(99)65, 24 April 1999,  par. 37. 
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(Cambridge: MA: .Harvard University Press, 1998), 103-105. 
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Planning and Shaping  (Arlington:  RAND, 2001), 72-73. 
34 Motyl, 28. 
35 Ibid.,  28. 
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in 2002 under President Kuchma to pursue a declared policy of “European Choice,” the 
Russian shadow over Ukraine still influenced Ukrainian political and foreign policy 
decisions.  In the end, growing corruption and the lack of dedicated reforms eventually 
led to a condition termed “Ukraine fatigue” by Western diplomats, and the hopes of 
European and Euro-Atlantic integration remained unlikely under Kuchma.36  However, 
the 2004 Presidential election and subsequent Orange Revolution in Ukraine changed the 
nature of this geopolitical dilemma and the course of Ukraine’s European and Euro-
Atlantic integration.  
C. THE ORANGE REVOLUTION 
Long before the actual voting, the 2004 Presidential election was shaping up as a 
pivotal event in a critical country.  Many major domestic issues divided the Ukrainian 
electorate including language (Russian vice Ukrainian), corruption, transparency, 
poverty, privatization, and human rights.  However, it was apparent on the macro level 
that the two main candidates for President offered very different plans for the future of 
Ukrainian foreign policy.  As a result, foreign assessments of the election often deduced 
that the electoral struggle pertained to differences in foreign policy between the 
candidates and billed the election as a clash between Eastern and Western influences.37   
With the support of outgoing President Kuchma and the powerful Ukrainian 
oligarchs, Prime Minister Victor Yanukovich and his “Party of Regions” lobbied to 
strengthen the existing ties with Russia and the CIS.  Russian President Vladimir Putin 
even traveled to Ukraine on two occasions during the election to campaign on behalf of 
Yanukovich.  Conversely, former-Prime Minister Victor Yushchenko and his “Peoples’ 
Power” coalition of two major parliamentary blocs sought to promote Western reforms 
and foster the growing Ukrainian relationships with the European and Euro-Atlantic 
communities.   
The campaign was contentious and the election was marred by controversy even 
before the first round of voting.  First, the Ukrainian media outlets continued to receive 
government mandated reporting guidelines, known as temnyky, during the election.  
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Consequently, most media reporting on Yushchenko throughout the campaign was 
negative, and stations that disseminated balanced information about the candidates were 
subject to government retribution.38  Second, in perhaps the most infamous episode of the 
election, Candidate Yushchenko became very ill in early September after having dinner 
with the head of the Ukrainian security services.  It was later determined that 
Yushchenko had been poisoned with a nearly lethal dose of dioxin.  Though Yushchenko 
ultimately recovered and resumed his campaign, his face remains severely pockmarked as 
a result of the dioxin poisoning.39   
1. The Elections 
With over 20 candidates vying for the Presidency, the first round of voting took 
place on October 31, 2004.  As expected, Yushchenko and Yanukovich emerged as the 
two top candidates during the first round.  Yushchenko received 39.87 percent of the vote 
and Yanukovich received 39.32 percent.  Though Yushchenko received a majority of the 
vote, the first round triggered a run-off election because neither candidate received more 
than 50 percent of the vote.40  Independent election observers from the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), of which Ukraine is a member, declared 
that the first round of voting did not meet international democratic standards due to 
numerous instances of government interference and media bias.41   
Following an additional three-week campaign period, the second round of voting 
occurred on November 21, 2004.  Yanukovich was initially declared the winner of the 
November runoff with a total of 49.46 percent to Yushchenko’s 46.61 percent of the vote.  
The results also revealed that voters in Eastern Ukraine voted overwhelmingly for 
Yanukovich, and Yushchenko received his support from Western Ukraine and Kyiv.  
However, OSCE observers again documented widespread cases of deliberate voter 
intimidation and election fraud.42 
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2.  The Birth of the “Revolution” 
On November 22, Yushchenko publicly disputed the runoff vote and vowed to 
challenge the results after evidence surfaced substantiating that the election was rigged.  
In response, hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians mobilized in Kyiv and across much of 
Central and Western Ukraine to support Yushchenko and protest the undemocratic results 
of the election.  Since Yushchenko’s campaign color was orange and much of the crowd 
donned orange clothing to show support for Yushchenko, the uprising became known as 
the “Orange Revolution.”43  Despite foul weather and stern threats of a crackdown by 
government security forces, the protesters continued their campaign of non-violent civil 
disobedience.  Yushchenko also received critical support during the revolution from Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs) that supported the democratic efforts as well as 
from prominent Ukrainians like Yulia Tymoschenko, an oligarch turned Ukrainian 
nationalist politician who became known as the “Orange Princess” for her efforts.   
In the West, reactions to the fraudulent election were unambiguous.  Officials 
from the United States questioned the validity of the election results and threatened to 
downgrade its relationship with Ukraine and hamper future Euro-Atlantic integration 
efforts.  The EU and European Parliament blatantly rejected the results of the election 
and offered to negotiate a diplomatic solution to resolve the election quandary.  In Russia, 
however, President Putin quickly congratulated Yanukovich on his apparent victory 
before the announcement of the official results.  Russian officials even condemned the 
charges of election fraud and viewed international calls for a repeat election as an attempt 
to increase Western influence in Ukraine.44   
Based on credible evidence of election fraud and government manipulation, the 
Ukrainian Supreme Court blocked the official publication of the election results on 
November 25 in order to review the case.  An additional week of massive public protests 
followed, and a vote of no confidence for Prime Minister Yanukovich in the Verkhovna 
Rada essentially brought the government in Kyiv to a standstill.  On December 3, the 
Supreme Court officially nullified the results of the November runoff and ordered a 
revote of the second round.   
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On December 26, 2004, Ukrainians went to the polls for the third time.  Turnout 
was reported to be 77.3 percent, and despite some election irregularities, the OSCE 
recognized a significant improvement during the revote.  With 51.99 percent of the vote 
to 44.19 percent, the Central Election Committee ultimately declared Victor Yushchenko 
the winner of the 2004 Presidential election.  Yanukovich unsuccessfully contested the 
legitimacy of the revote and Yushchenko was inaugurated on January 23, 2005.45 
3. Significance of the Orange Revolution 
For many Ukrainians, the Orange Revolution symbolized the triumph of 
democracy over tyranny and corruption.  Under former-President Kuchma, Ukraine 
remained a semi-authoritarian “hybrid regime,” mixing democratic features with 
authoritarian overtones.  Prior to the election, corruption was growing, the media was 
controlled, and democracy was manipulated.46  In his analysis of the election, Taras 
Kuzio concludes that the Orange Revolution “represented the second and final stage in 
the Ukrainian revolution that began towards the end of the Soviet era.”  He argues that 
the events in Ukraine combined three revolutions: “national, democratic, and anti-
corruption.”47 
Freedom House, a prominent NGO that advocates and rates democracy around the 
world, promptly modified its ratings for Ukraine to reflect the extraordinary results of the 
Orange Revolution.  Freedom House improved Ukraine’s Freedom in the World Civil 
Liberties rating from a “4” to a “3” even prior to Yushchenko’s inauguration.48  In 
addition, Freedom House praised the democratic gains in Ukraine in its Nations in 
Transit publication and called the triumph an “impressive success story for democracy in 
Eastern Europe.”  In this publication, Ukraine received much higher marks in Electoral 
Process, Civil Society, and Independent Media.  All three ratings improved by nearly 
three-quarters of a point over 2004.  By comparison, Russia lost ground in all three of 
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these categories during the same period.49  Interestingly, some sources have named 
Freedom House as an “underwriter” of the Orange Revolution.50   
The Orange Revolution also amplified Ukraine’s geopolitical predicament 
between West and East.  For Russia, the Orange Revolution and subsequent election of 
Yushchenko were stinging defeats.  Putin overtly supported Yanukovich during the 
election, and as a result, Russia lost significant political capital and influence in Ukraine.  
However, Yushchenko could not burn Ukrainian diplomatic, economic, and social 
bridges with the Russian Federation.  In fact, the day after his inauguration, Yushchenko 
traveled to Moscow to discuss the future of the Russian-Ukrainian relationship with 
President Putin.   
For the West, the election debacle and uprising ultimately reaffirmed Ukrainian 
dedication to Western values.  Riding on the heels of the “Rose Revolution” in Georgia a 
year earlier, the Orange Revolution and election of Yushchenko provided the West with 
another chance to consolidate democratic gains in the former Soviet Union as well as 
Eastern Europe.  It also afforded the opportunity for the European and Euro-Atlantic 
communities to revitalize their relationships with Ukraine after President Yushchenko 
elucidated his strategic vision for Ukraine during his inaugural address on January 23, 
2005:  
Ukraine will be neither a buffer nor a contest area.  …Ukraine will be a 
reliable partner in the fight against old and new threats: tyranny, war, 
poverty, natural disasters and terrorism. …Our way to the future – is the 
way followed by the United Europe. We are the people of the same 
civilization sharing the same values. History, economic prospects and the 
interests of people give a clear answer – where we should look for our 
fate. Our place is in the European Union. My goal is – Ukraine in the 
United Europe.”51 
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D. THE EUROPEAN UNION 
President Yushchenko’s inaugural address makes it unequivocally clear that his 
Administration desires closer ties with Europe and membership in the EU.  However, the 
question remains – is Europe ready to integrate Ukraine into the EU?  Prior to the 2004 
election, estimates for Ukrainian accession ranged anywhere from 2011 to 2030 due to 
the “less than optimal” economic and political conditions in Ukraine.52  The renewed 
“European Choice” policy coupled with enhanced commitments to democratic values and 
ambitious reforms should have improved the prospects of integration into the EU.  
However, the probability of Ukrainian accession remains slim.  In fact, the EU has 
declined officially to acknowledge the possibility of Ukrainian membership – even after 
the Orange Revolution.53  This remains the case for two primary reasons.  First, EU 
accession requirements are strict, and, due to lack of meaningful reforms and corruption 
during the Kuchma Administration, Ukrainian accession into the EU in the near term is 
simply not feasible.  Second, the EU has internal problems related to enlargement that 
will hamper Ukrainian accession.  These include the rejection of the EU Constitution and 
the fear of over-expansion. 
1. The EU-Ukraine Relationship 
The first agreement between the EU and Ukraine occurred in June 1994 after 
President Kravchuk brokered the Ukrainian replacement to the 1990 Soviet Partnership 
and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with the EU.  The PCA developed some institutional 
connections between Ukraine and the EU, but it was not a “prescription” for EU 
membership.54  After the initial negotiations, the EU did not immediately ratify the 
Ukrainian PCA.  It took another four years for the PCA to come into effect, and this 
initial lack of interest in Ukraine set the tone for the relationship between the two.  Kuzio 
argues that the EU viewed Ukraine as a subset of Russia and preferred to deal with 
Russia and Ukraine on the same dimension.  Consequently, the EU was in no hurry to 
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integrate Ukraine for fear of meddling in the Russian sphere of influence.55  In 1998, the 
EU ratified the PCA and Ukraine officially declared its intention to join the Union.  
As a European state, Ukraine is technically eligible for membership in the EU 
under Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), but the 1993 Copenhagen 
Criteria outline three specific accession requirements for potential member states: 
(1) Stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, 
human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities 
 
(2)   The existence of a functioning market economy as well as the 
capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces 
within the Union 
 
(3)   The ability to take on the obligations of membership including 
adherence to the aims of political, economic, and monetary union 
The first two criteria are somewhat vague and open to interpretation and the third 
criterion involves strict economic, political, and social requirements listed in the 80,000 
pages of treaties and agreements known as the acquis communautaire.  Candidate 
countries must comply with the first two criteria for membership consideration and 
complete the acquis prior to accession into the Union.56   
With limited U.S. assistance, Ukraine lobbied the EU in 1999 to develop a 
sweeping charter that would open the door for future integration, but the EU refused.  
Instead, Ukraine and the EU inked a “Common Strategy” that focused more on 
democratic support, economic transition, and strengthened cooperation than the 
possibility of accession.57  The Common Strategy represented a marked improvement in 
the bilateral relationship between Ukraine and the EU; however, less than a year after the 
agreement, a controversy known as “Kuchmagate” became public.  During 
“Kuchmagate,” one of the President’s bodyguards released audio tapes of Kuchma 
apparently ordering the murder of journalist Georgiy Gongadze.  In addition, the tapes 
included discussions on illegal weapons sales, election rigging, and high-level 
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corruption.58  Democracy, rule of law, and human rights in Ukraine were slipping, and 
the already slim chances for European integration plummeted.  Tellingly, the Common 
Strategy was the last major agreement between the two until after the Orange Revolution. 
Ukraine and the EU continued their dialogue, but both sides adopted “virtual 
policies” towards each other.  Ukraine declared its intentions to pursue integration, but 
adopted polices that often contradicted the declarations.  In response, the EU declared its 
intention to work with Ukraine without agreeing to any long-term goals.  This discourse 
produced few meaningful reforms in Ukraine and no membership carrot from the EU.  It 
ultimately led to political stagnation and the EU contracted a case of “Ukraine fatigue.”59  
With a managed democracy and an oligarchic economy, Ukraine remained noticeably 
deficient in all three Copenhagen Criteria prior to the 2004 Presidential Election.  Though 
the Orange Revolution made great strides for Ukrainian democracy and rule of law, the 
years of corruption and unproductive reforms still impinge on Ukrainian integration 
efforts. 
2. Enlargement Difficulties 
In addition to strict accession requirements, the EU is also coping with internal 
enlargement problems that will ultimately delay Ukrainian accession.  First, the French 
and Dutch voters rejected the European Constitution in May and June of 2005.  This is 
significant because it has refocused much of the EU’s attention on efforts to deepen the 
Union.60  Second, the 2004 enlargement added 10 new Member States, and the future 
enlargement queue already contains four Candidate States: Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia, 
and Turkey.   
Both of these issues limit the ability of the EU to accept more Candidate States.  
On November 9, 2005, EU Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn stated, “the EU’s 
absorption capacity is stretched to its limits.  …We need to consolidate our enlargement 
agenda but be cautious with new commitments.”  Unfortunately, this agenda leaves out 
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Ukraine and focuses on the Balkans and controversial talks with Turkey.61  In addition, 
the EU is even threatening to delay the scheduled accession for Romania and Bulgaria 
into the Union because of increased corruption and legislative shortfalls.  Rehn may 
recommend delaying the accession of these countries from 2007 to 2008.62  This also has 
the potential to push back the timeline for future enlargement considerations. 
On a positive note, a poll of EU citizens conducted by the European Union in 
May-June 2005 showed that Europeans would rather bring Ukraine into the EU than 
Turkey by a ratio of 45 percent to Turkey’s 35 percent.  Ukraine even matched the 
support of Romania and received 66 percent support within the ten new member states.63   
3. After the Revolution 
Although the EU flatly rejected Yushchenko’s push for membership talks, the EU 
and Ukraine promptly signed a three-year EU/Ukraine Action Plan in February 2005 
within the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) as a consolation.  
The Union implemented the ENP in order to “share the benefits of the EU’s 2004 
expansion to neighbouring countries…[in order] to prevent the emergence of dividing 
lines between the enlarged EU and its neighbours.”   
The EU/Ukraine Action Plan provides Ukraine with “concrete steps to strengthen 
the EU-Ukraine relationship.”  Though Poland, Hungary, and Lithuania lobbied to further 
upgrade the EU relationship with Ukraine, the agreement only recognizes Ukraine’s 
European aspirations and does not “open the door” for EU integration and remains 
“distinct from the issue of potential membership.”64  The agreement will help prevent an 
economic and political “Schengen curtain” from forming between Ukraine and the new 
EU members on its borders by implementing ambitious political and economic reforms to 
aide greater European security and stability.65  The agreement also includes ten points for 
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closer cooperation that were “conceived following the December election” and 
“substantially beyond what was originally on offer.”  These proposals include early 
consultations with the EU, closer ESDP cooperation, visa facilitation, and a substantial 
increase in foreign aid from the European Community from €128 million in 2004 to €250 
million in 2005.66   
One of the most important aspects of the new agreement centers on World Trade 
Organization (WTO) membership, which is the “first and crucial step towards a Free 
Trade Agreement with the EU.”  Since the WTO is scheduled to meet in mid-December 
2005 to evaluate possible Ukrainian membership, the Action Plan offers up “further 
support to Ukraine’s WTO accession.”67  Since January, Yushchenko has pressed many 
necessary reforms in Ukraine to facilitate WTO accession; however, WTO membership 
will likely require Ukraine to scuttle the SES agreement with the CIS, and debate over the 
WTO has produced literal fistfights in the Verkhovna Rada.  Yushchenko remains 
optimistic about Ukraine’s chances for accession, but in October 2005, the Director 
General of the WTO Pascal Lamy commented that Ukraine will likely not be able to 
finish necessary negotiations in time and should “wait a bit” for WTO membership.68   
In another consolation for Ukraine, the EU decided in November 2005 to grant 
Ukraine “market economy status” by early 2006.  This is positive for integration efforts 
for three reasons.  First, this will help boost trade between Ukraine and the EU by 
reducing anti-dumping duties on Ukrainian imports.  Second, this helps Ukraine fulfill 
the second Copenhagen Criterion regarding market economies.  Third, it provides an 
important political and economic win for Yushchenko after the re-privatization of 
Kryvorizhstal Steel in October 2005.   
Despite the democratic success of the Orange Revolution, it is clear that Ukraine 
will not meet the lofty goal of rapid accession into the EU because the EU still does not 
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have an “open door policy” for Ukraine.  Though Ukrainian integration into the EU is 
taking longer than hoped, President Yushchenko noted, “more has been done in EU 
relations over the past seven or eight months than in the past 10 years.”69  Yushchenko’s 
Orange Revolution has lost some of its initial momentum over the past year, but Ukraine 
is still on a much better track with the EU now than it ever was under Kuchma.70  Until 
recently, the EU viewed Russia and Ukraine as inseparable partners.  Therefore, one of 
the most promising developments stemming from the Orange Revolution is that with the 
EU/Ukraine Action Plan, the EU has finally decoupled the Russian and Ukrainian 
strategic agendas.71   
The next major event in the partnership is the EU-Ukraine Summit on December 
1, 2005.  This Summit is important because it will focus on economic gains and visa 
liberalizations.  The Parliamentary Elections in March 2006 are also very important for 
the political development of the EU/Ukraine partnership.  Without free and fair elections, 
Ukraine simply cannot meet the democratic standards required by the EU. 
E.  CONCLUSION 
Since its independence, Ukraine has become an important component for security 
and stability in Europe, Eurasia and beyond.  Despite early Ukrainian desires to pursue 
Westernization, the structural and cultural connections with Russia created a foreign and 
security policy dilemma for Ukraine as it became the “gray area” between Central Europe 
and Russia.  Under the Kuchma Administration, the Ukrainian political relationships with 
the West stagnated due to “multi-vectorism” and “Ukraine fatigue,” but under the 
Yushchenko Administration, Ukraine has renewed its European and Euro-Atlantic 
integration efforts.  However, a new dilemma has emerged.   
First, Yushchenko cannot discard the important Ukrainian diplomatic, economic, 
and social bridges with the Russian Federation.  Despite blatant Russian influence during 
the election in favor of his opponent, Yushchenko’s first foreign trip as President of 
Ukraine was to Moscow to meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin.  President 
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Yushchenko even referred to Russia as Ukraine’s “eternal strategic partner.”72  Second, 
Ukraine ultimately desires EU membership, but accession remains unlikely in the near 
future.  Consequently, Ukrainian aspirations for meaningful Western integration now 
appear to rest with NATO, and President Yushchenko says of his new priority for 
Ukraine, “It is only logical that we target our efforts toward the integration into 
NATO.”73   
Although Ukraine still lacks the political, economic, and social résumé required to 
join the EU, NATO may help to anchor democratic gains, “Europeanize” Ukraine, and 
increase the likelihood of EU membership in the future.74  In fact, many other countries 
in Central and Eastern Europe have followed this path.  Poland, Hungary, Romania, 
Bulgaria, and the Czech Republic have all successfully used Euro-Atlantic integration as 
a stepping-stone for further European integration with the EU.  As a result, the next 
chapter explores the Ukrainian relationship with NATO. 
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III. THE NATO QUESTION  
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter explores the next aspect of the Ukrainian dilemma – the question of 
NATO membership.  Now that a democratic Ukraine is knocking on NATO’s door, is 
NATO willing to answer?  The evidence shows that unlike the EU, NATO is now 
fundamentally prepared to open its door for Ukraine.  This is the case for three primary 
reasons.  First, despite periods of political rhetoric, empty change, and diplomatic fatigue, 
NATO and Ukraine forged durable ties of military cooperation and defense reform that 
have endured since the early days of Ukrainian statehood.  The Orange Revolution was 
the much-needed catalyst for meaningful political reform, but the existing bonds of 
mutual aid and consultation are the foundation for future Ukrainian integration into 
NATO.  Second, Ukraine offers NATO critical strategic airlift capability, key 
geostrategic position, and other capabilities that augment the Alliance’s shortfalls.  Third 
(and most importantly), NATO’s overriding democratic principles and enlargement 
doctrine dictate that the Alliance should help consolidate the democratic gains in 
Ukraine.  Additionally, Ukraine has powerful supporters within the Alliance that support 
these efforts and are pushing for intensified talks.  
As a result, NATO recently upgraded Ukraine’s relationship and implemented an 
Intensified Dialogue with Ukraine, moving it one-step closer to the Membership Action 
Plan and the Open Door.  With continued cooperation, consultation, and “common 
values,” NATO can foster meaningful reforms within Ukraine and help anchor Ukraine 
with the West.75  Despite this support, however, NATO membership is not a foregone 
conclusion.  Ukraine must still make difficult decisions and implement difficult reforms 
in order to overcome critical obstacles to Euro-Atlantic integration. 
B. THE COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIP 
During the last fifteen years, both NATO and Ukraine have endured massive, 
fundamental transformations.  NATO matured from a Cold War alliance focused on 
“keeping the peace” to a flexible and modern organization “actively promoting the 
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peace.”76  Meanwhile, Ukraine developed from an obscure Soviet republic overshadowed 
by Russia into a promising European democracy.  In many ways, the relationship 
between NATO and Ukraine has been symbiotic, and the future success of Ukraine’s 
European and Euro-Atlantic integration depends largely on the cooperation and reform 
accomplished during these formative years.   
This section analyzes the evolution of the NATO-Ukraine partnership from 
Ukrainian independence to the Orange Revolution in order to highlight the formal 
agreements, cooperation, and consultation that define the relationship and will help future 
integration efforts.  It divides the relationship into four distinct stages of political and 
military cooperation, centered on three specific events that changed the political nature of 
the NATO-Ukraine relationship.  These events are the Russian incursion into Kosovo, the 
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, and the Orange Revolution. 
1. Rediscovering the West 
Ukraine declared independence on August 24, 1991, but Western recognition of 
Ukrainian independence was unhurried.  On December 2, 1991, Poland became the first 
state to recognize Ukrainian independence following the referendum and Canada 
followed the Polish lead later in the day to become the second state and, more 
importantly, the first NATO member to recognize Ukrainian independence.77  In contrast, 
President George H. W. Bush express concerns about “suicidal nationalism” in Ukraine, 
and the United States did not recognize Ukrainian independence until after the Soviet flag 
was lowered from atop the Kremlin for the last time on December 25, 1991.78 
Despite the initial lack of unity in recognition by the West, the relationship 
between Ukraine and NATO quickly commenced.  Ukraine immediately joined the North 
Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), and NATO Secretary-General Manfred Woerner 
made his first official visit to post-Soviet Kyiv on February 22, 1992.  Western countries 
and institutions began working with Ukraine shortly after its independence to help secure 
and remove the 4,400 Soviet nuclear weapons and associated support equipment located 
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within Ukraine.79  On March 24, 1992, Ukraine signed the Open Skies Treaty to ensure 
arms control transparency and in May 1992, Ukraine agreed to transfer the nuclear 
weapons in Ukraine to Russia under the terms of the Lisbon Protocol.  By October 1994, 
Ukraine had agreed to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I – November 
1993), the Trilateral Agreement with Russia and the United States (January 1994), and 
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT – October 1994).  After inheriting the third 
largest nuclear arsenal in the World, Ukraine officially became a non-nuclear state in 
June 1996 after the removal of the final nuclear warhead.  The voluntary Ukrainian 
nuclear disarmament facilitated improved relations, financial assistance, and certain 
security guarantees from the United States and the West.80  Although NATO did not 
directly conduct the non-proliferation talks, it “warmly welcomed” the results as a 
positive step in European security and stability.81   
As the decade progressed, Ukraine eagerly volunteered for NATO initiatives, 
exercises, and missions.  In February 1994, Ukraine became the first CIS country to sign 
up for NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) initiative.  The goal of PfP was to improve 
defense planning, cooperation, and dialogue with non-NATO countries.  Though 
countries like Poland apprehensively viewed PfP as an attempt to stall NATO 
enlargement, Ukraine embraced the program as a means to increase security and defense 
cooperation with the West.82  In 1995, NATO upgraded Ukraine’s PfP status with the 
Individual Partnership Program (IPP), and Ukraine volunteered to participate in the first 
Planning and Review Process (PARP) in order to improve military interoperability with 
NATO.83 
In 1995, Ukraine augmented NATO’s Implementation Force in Bosnia (IFOR) 
with 550 infantry troops, and eventually provided additional troops for the Stabilization 
Force (SFOR) and the Kosovo Force (KFOR).  Since Ukraine deployed its first UN 
peacekeepers to the Balkans in 1992, 18,000 Ukrainian troops have participated in 
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peacekeeping missions around the world.  Ukraine has garnered a reputation as a 
professional and reliable peacekeeping force, as well as an asset for non-Article 5 NATO 
missions centered on crisis management and peace operations.84   
In 1996, Ukrainian cooperation and participation with NATO continued to 
blossom.  Ukraine participated in 150 PfP activities, including 17 military exercises.  Of 
those exercises, “Peace Shield-96,” was the first NATO multilateral exercise “in the spirit 
of PfP” to take place on Ukrainian territory.85  By this time, the size of the Ukrainian 
Armed Forces had been reduced from 800,000 in 1991 to 400,000.  These defense 
reforms were necessary to offset the large inherited Soviet force structure and major 
economic problems that were plaguing Ukraine.86  Two years later, NATO established 
the Joint Working Group on Defense Reform (JWGDR) to facilitate consultation on 
planning, downsizing, and civil-military relations with Ukraine.   
Ukraine’s apparent enthusiasm for NATO cooperation and consultation paid off 
when NATO and Ukraine signed the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership at the Madrid 
Summit on July 9, 1997 – the day after NATO invited Poland, Hungary, and the Czech 
Republic to join the Alliance.  The Charter affirmed the “importance of a strong and 
enduring relationship between NATO and Ukraine,” recognized the “solid 
progress…across a broad range of activities” between the two, and aimed to “promote 
further stability and democratic values in Central and Eastern Europe.”87  The Charter did 
not offer membership or extend Article 5 protection to Ukraine, but it assured Ukraine an 
increased consultative voice through the NATO-Ukraine Council (NUC), and offered 
expanded areas of future cooperation with NATO.88   
Interestingly, Ukraine signed the Charter less than two months after the 
endorsement of the NATO-Russia Founding Act on May 27, 1997, and the Treaty on 
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Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership (“The Friendship Treaty”) between Ukraine and 
the Russian Federation on May 31, 1997.89  The former spelled out the non-adversarial 
relationship between NATO and Russia, and the latter normalized the Russia-Ukraine 
relationship and resolved the BSF issue.  Although Ukraine had no official aspirations for 
NATO membership at this time, it appears that Ukraine strategically balanced West 
against East by leveraging Russian fears NATO expansion into Eastern Europe in order 
to acquire its own concessions from Moscow.90  This episode highlighted the utility and 
strength of Ukraine’s “multi-vector” foreign policy.91     
The NATO-Ukraine relationship took an interesting and ultimately unpleasant 
turn in 1999 after NATO commenced Operation Allied Force in Kosovo.  Despite 
Russian calls for “Slavic unity” and NATO requests for support, President Kuchma 
established a position as an honest broker between NATO and the Southern Slavic Serbs 
in Kosovo.  Following the commencement of the operation, President Kuchma proposed 
a three-stage peace settlement for Kosovo to President Slobodon Milosevic and the 
Contact Group.  His proposal included an immediate end to NATO air strikes, 
withdrawal of Yugoslav forces, disarmament of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), and 
the implementation of a neutral peacekeeping force comprised of non-aligned countries.92  
In addition to political channels, Kuchma continued his lobbying effort by outlining his 
plan in a commentary published in The Wall Street Journal just days prior to NATO’s 
50th anniversary summit in Washington, DC.93   
On June 11, 1999, a day after the end of NATO air strikes, two hundred Russian 
SFOR peacekeeping troops left their positions in Bosnia en route to Kosovo to partition a 
Serbian-friendly zone outside the control of NATO.  Russian troops seized the Slatina 
airfield near Pristina, but the Russian reinforcement flights with a contingent of 1,000 
men never arrived.  In a dramatic show of unity with NATO, Romania, Bulgaria, and 
Hungary successfully blocked the Russian advance.  The denial of Russian over-flight 
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rights by these three countries is well documented, but in a lesser-known revolt, Ukraine 
also refused the initial Russian request for over-flight rights.94  Ukraine’s geopolitical and 
strategic importance even in the post-Cold War environment became painfully clear for 
Russia. 
The Ukrainian betrayal enraged Moscow, and Ukraine quickly retracted its air 
space restriction in the “face of Russian fury.” Although the incident was subsequently 
blamed on a “misunderstanding,” many sources make it clear that the refusal was not 
merely an oversight, but a short-lived display of solidarity with NATO.95  Adding insult 
to injury for Russia, the incident occurred less than two months after NATO’s initial 
round of expansion into the perceived Russian sphere of influence.  In addition, the April 
release of NATO’s new 1999 Strategic Concept likely amplified Russian fears of NATO 
intervention in Chechnya in the name of “crisis management.”   
The period between Ukrainian independence and the end of Operation Allied 
Force in 1999 produced significant areas of cooperation and reform for NATO and 
Ukraine.  Ukraine was an eager partner and a formidable peacekeeping asset, while 
NATO established mechanisms for Ukrainian consultation and defense reform.  Most 
importantly, NATO offered Ukraine a European political and security alternative to 
Russia and the CIS in the wake of the Soviet collapse.  Contrary to Russian fears, 
Ukraine did not formally aspire to join NATO, and NATO unofficially recognized that 
Ukraine was beyond the “horizontal lines” of Russian influence – at least in the short 
term.96  However, Ukraine misplayed its “multi-vector” foreign policy and made a stand 
against Russia at exactly the wrong moment, and the ensuing rift marked the end of the 
initial stage of robust cooperation between NATO and Ukraine. 
2. Eastern Regression? 
Shortly after Allied Force and the failed incursion into Kosovo, President Yeltsin 
“invited” Kuchma to his dacha (ironically named “Rus”) to discuss “the development of 
Ukrainian-Russian relations.”  To reprimand Ukraine for siding with NATO, Yeltsin was 
prepared to use available Russian leverage in the energy and trade sectors to ensure 
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Ukrainian neutrality.  In addition, Russia threatened to undermine Kuchma in the 1999 
presidential election by overtly supporting his opponent.97  Not surprisingly, upon his 
return from Russia, Kuchma announced that Russia and Ukraine were strategic partners, 
“and there cannot be an alternative” to friendly relations with Russia.98  With a little tug 
from Mother Russia, Ukraine quickly rediscovered its Eastern roots.  
Cooperation between NATO and Ukraine continued, but with less forward 
momentum.  In August 1999, Ukraine deployed its 14th Helicopter Company to support 
the KFOR peacekeeping mission.  The company remained in the Balkans for 19 months 
and completed 6,500 missions.  Ukraine also deployed 334 soldiers as part of a joint 
Ukrainian-Polish Battalion (UKRPOLBAT) that conducted peacekeeping missions 
during KFOR.99 
Kyiv hosted the NUC summit on March 1, 2000.  The next day, the Verkhovna 
Rada ratified the NATO PfP Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), which facilitated 
increased Ukrainian PfP participation.100  Ukraine also continued to participate in NATO 
exercises.  In June 2000, ten NATO members and six partners participated in 
“Cooperative Partner-2000.”  It was the largest NATO exercise ever conducted in a 
former-Soviet state.101 
In November 2000, NATO distanced itself politically from Ukraine after the 
allegations of widespread corruption and abuse of power surfaced involving President 
Kuchma during “Kuchmagate.”  The blatant corruption and abuses of power were not 
acceptable for an Alliance “founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty 
and the rule of law.”102  In response, NATO extended Kuchma the diplomatic snub, and 
hopes for further European integration were essentially stalled – at least until the attacks 
of September 11, 2001. 
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In an interesting twist of cooperation, however, the lack of deeper integration 
options after Kuchmagate refocused NATO cooperation mechanisms on defense reform.  
In 2000, Ukraine adopted the State Program of Armed Forces Development and Reform 
2001-2005.  Consultation with the JWGDR in 2001 helped correct “grossly out of 
balance” force levels, and a 2001 PARP review outlined integration and inventory 
issues.103  These reforms reduced the projected size of the military down to 295,000 
troops by 2005, and aimed to implement an all-volunteer force by 2015.104 
Renewed Russian influence coupled with blatant political abuse during this period 
hindered the hopes of deeper Euro-Atlantic integration.  However, NATO and Ukraine 
continued to use the previously developed military channels to cooperate and consult in 
order to produce worthwhile defense reforms, in spite of political shortcomings stemming 
from Kosovo and Kuchmagate. 
3. From Cooperation to Ukraine Fatigue 
In addition to the fundamental shift for the Alliance as a whole, the events of 
September 11, 2001, dramatically changed the nature of the NATO-Ukraine relationship.  
NATO invoked Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty for the first time in its history on 
September 12, 2001 to assist the United States following the coordinated terrorist attacks 
on U.S. soil.  Article 5 is the collective defense provision in NATO that was originally 
part of the Cold War collective defense strategy against the Soviet Union.  Likewise, the 
NUC convened on September 14, 2001 to denounce the attacks, and Ukraine expressed 
its readiness to contribute to the Global War on Terrorism.  On September 24, 2001, 
Ukraine agreed to allow U.S. transport aircraft to fly through Ukrainian airspace “in the 
spirit of the Distinctive Partnership with NATO,” and it leased An-124 Ruslan cargo 
planes to the German Bundeswehr for anti-terrorist operations.  In the first six months of 
this initiative, over one thousand aircraft transited through Ukrainian airspace in support 
of anti-terrorist operations.105   
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Over the course of eight months, the Ukrainian relationship with NATO rapidly 
changed from lukewarm to red-hot.  The capstone occurred on May 23, 2002, when 
Ukraine formally announced its intention to join NATO as a full member and pursue a 
“European Choice” policy.  This decision was announced after a meeting of the 
Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council (NSDC) determined that a 
nonalignment multi-vector foreign policy “holds no promise” for Ukraine in the post-
September 11 world.106  Out of obvious deference to Russia, however, the final green 
light for Ukraine to pursue formal NATO membership followed a public statement by 
Russian President Putin declaring that he saw nothing bad in the notion of Ukrainian 
membership in NATO.  Not surprisingly, Putin’s endorsement came just days before the 
creation of the NATO-Russia Partnership at the Rome Summit.107   
Despite the renewed promise of alliance, the happy engagement between NATO 
and Ukraine was short lived.  In September 2002, on the eve of the Prague Summit, an 
additional Kuchmagate tape was released in which President Kuchma allegedly approved 
the sale of four highly advanced “Kolchuga radars” to Iraq in July 2000.  In light of UN 
sanctions in Iraq, this revelation was an obvious affront to the UN, NATO, and the 
United States.  After repeated episodes of corruption and blatant legal violations, 
Kuchma’s reputation in NATO was moribund.108   
Nevertheless, Ukrainian officials drafted the NATO-Ukraine Action Plan at the 
Prague Summit in November 2002 in an attempt to salvage the strained relations with 
NATO.  The Action Plan covered an extensive array of reforms, from political and 
economic to informational and legal issues.  The Action Plan also clearly identified 
Ukraine’s “aspirations towards full integration into Euro-Atlantic security structures,” but 
many of the declarations were largely rhetorical.109  For example, the first political 
principle in the document reads, “Ukraine will continue to pursue internal policies based 
on strengthening democracy and the rule of law.”110  This was ironic considering that 
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Kuchma was caught on tape discussing his role in election tampering two years earlier.  It 
appeared that the Kuchma Administration was trying to declare its way into NATO.  This 
tactic did not fool NATO, however, and in a speech to the NATO-Ukraine Consultations 
group on May 5, 2003, Secretary-General Lord Robertson stated, “The time for political 
declaration is over, and Ukraine must now take action to implement the commitments it 
made in Prague.”111  As with the EU, the propensity of the Ukrainian Government to 
make declaratory promises without implementation led to “Ukraine fatigue” in NATO.   
A year later, in the 2004 Istanbul Summit Communiqué, NATO recognized 
positive areas of Ukrainian military cooperation but encouraged Ukraine to “accelerate 
the implementation of the objectives outlined in the NATO-Ukraine Action Plan.”  The 
communiqué also made the future of the NATO-Ukraine relationship clear: “A further 
strengthening of our relationship will require stronger evidence of Ukraine’s commitment 
to comprehensive reform, in particular with a view to the conduct of presidential 
elections this autumn.”112  Though NATO continued to transform and expand into 
Eastern Europe, the dichotomy of meaningful military cooperation and political 
obstruction plunged Ukraine into a Euro-Atlantic purgatory in which neither integration 
nor exclusion seemed possible.  Ukraine proffered valuable airlift assets and strategic 
location for the GWOT while formally lobbying for NATO membership; however, 
presidential corruption and a lack of necessary reforms stifled any chance of further 
NATO integration under Kuchma.  As a result, President Kuchma changed his national 
strategy less than three weeks after the Istanbul Summit and removed preparations for 
NATO membership from Ukrainian military doctrine.113 
Consequently, the 2004 election was as a crucial moment for the future of the 
NATO-Ukraine relationship long before the election.  Accordingly, the tampered results 
of the November runoff election in favor of Yanukovich invoked a strong reaction from 
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NATO.  On November 26, two days after the certification of the runoff results by the 
Central Election Commission, Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer proclaimed:  
The democratic future of Ukraine, the Alliance’s neighbor and strategic 
partner, is of direct and vital interest to NATO.  ...NATO remains 
committed to doing all it can to help Ukraine…take her rightful place in 
the Euro-Atlantic community.114 
The fraudulent election in November was the pinnacle of Ukraine fatigue, but the Orange 
Revolution reversed the regression and became the catalyst for Ukraine’s dramatic 
democratic transition and integration efforts. 
4. The Political Catalyst 
The Orange Revolution and ensuing democratic election of Yushchenko finally 
provided NATO with the opportunity to augment years of comprehensive military and 
defense cooperation with a new administration genuinely committed to political reform 
and Euro-Atlantic integration efforts.  Following the freer and fairer election on 
December 26, Secretary-General Scheffer released a statement praising the triumph of the 
Orange Revolution:   
Ukraine is an important strategic partner for the Alliance, and we look 
forward to working with the new Ukrainian leadership to deepen our 
cooperation even further.  Clearly this development is relevant to NATO’s 
political relationship with Ukraine.  Our overriding goal – to assist 
Ukraine to realize its Euro-Atlantic aspirations and to promote stability in 
the region – remains unchanged.115 
On February 22, 2005, less than one month after his inauguration, Yushchenko 
traveled to Brussels to attend his first meeting of the NUC as President of Ukraine.  This 
summit was particularly important because Yushchenko formally reaffirmed his desire 
for NATO integration during his opening remarks to the NUC:  
We believe that Ukraine’s participation and engagement in the North 
Atlantic community of democratic peoples will strengthen peace and 
security on the European continent.  We are ready to make all necessary  
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efforts to achieve this noble goal.  … [T]he European future of Ukraine is 
inseparably linked with the deepening of its relationships with the 
alliance.116 
After President Yushchenko’s declaration, Scheffer replied that the Alliance was “fully 
committed to a rich and progressively stronger partnership with Ukraine.”117   
Ironically, Yushchenko delivered this speech on the anniversary of Secretary-
General Woerner’s first visit to Ukraine.118  Over that thirteen-year period, Ukraine 
developed from a diffident former Soviet republic into a keystone of European security 
with an impressive history of NATO participation.  Despite the obvious political 
shortcomings at times during the relationship, Ukraine’s previous military cooperation 
efforts are paving the way for future integration.  
C. UKRAINIAN LEVERAGE  
The second reason that the Alliance will court Ukraine centers on Ukrainian 
capabilities that compliment NATO shortfalls.  In other words, Ukraine actually has a 
certain amount of leverage with NATO.  At the 2002 Prague Summit, NATO created the 
NATO Response Force (NRF) and approved the Prague Capabilities Commitment 
(PCC).  Based on the wider-ranging 1999 Defense Capabilities Initiative (DCI), the PCC 
identified specific critical Alliance shortfalls in eight key areas.  Ukraine offers NATO 
capabilities that support the Prague initiatives with strategic airlift and geostrategic 
position that augment NATO’s deficiencies.119  
1. Strategic Airlift 
The most important tangible asset that Ukraine offers NATO is strategic airlift 
support.  The United States has impressive strategic airlift capability, but in the spirit of 
burden shifting, the United States pressured the Europeans to upgrade their forces for 
post-enlargement power projection.120  In 2002, most NATO members still had 
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inadequate airlift resources because the Airbus A400M, the proposed replacement 
platform, was still in development.  In fact, the A400M will not be ready for widespread 
operation in Europe until 2012.  Meanwhile, Ukraine owns an extensive and capable fleet 
of heavy-lift aircraft that it leases to other countries and organizations for cargo 
operations.  Coupled with its attractive geostrategic location at the crossroads of Europe 
and Asia, Ukraine offers the Alliance a much-needed strategic airlift stopgap with 
capabilities that exceed those already in NATO.121  
 
Table 1. Comparison of Strategic Airlift Assets 
 
Table 1 demonstrates that Ukrainian Antonov and Illiushin cargo aircraft 
incorporate impressive strategic airlift capacities that even exceed U.S. heavy lifters and 
other NATO assets.  In addition to scores of Il-76 Candid transport aircraft for military 
use, the Ukrainian government owns ANTK Antonov, which, in turn, operates its own 
cargo carrier.  Antonov Airlines owns a fleet of eight An-124 Ruslan aircraft (NATO 
name: Condor) and the only existing An-225 Mriya aircraft (NATO name: Cossack).  
Incidentally, the Mriya is the largest cargo aircraft in the world and it set the world record 
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AIRCRAFT Cargo Load  (lb) Cargo Area (ft3) Range (nm)[load] 
*An-225  551,150 42,934.5  2,425 [440K] 
*An-124 330,700 40,965 1,997 [330K] 
C-5 261,000 34,765  2,982 [261K] 
C-17 169,000 20,900  2,400 [160K] 
*Il-76 MD 103,615 8,310  2,051 [103K] 
A400M 81,570 12,570 2,450 [66K] 
C-130J-30 79,291 6,022 2,832 [35K] 
C-160 35,275 4,940  1,000 [35K] 
Source: Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft.  *Ukrainian owned assets. 
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for carrying 253 tons during a flight that took place at the same time as terrorist carried 
out attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001.122   
Due to its strategic airlift shortfalls, NATO extensively leases these cargo assets 
from Ukraine.  Between 2002 and 2003, Antonov Airlines alone completed 440 flights 
for NATO carrying more than 30,000 tons of cargo.123  NATO also leases heavy 
strategic-lift assets from Russia on occasion, but NATO prefers a long-term formal 
agreement with Ukraine regarding the use of its airplanes.  In 2003, a group of 11 
countries signed an initial letter of intent on airlift, and on June 7, 2004, Ukraine signed 
the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Strategic Lift with NATO.  This MoU 
allows NATO to use up to six Ukrainian An-124s on short notice to transport NATO 
assets and other cargo to operational areas that can assist with critical NRF 
deployments.124  In addition, the Verkhovna Rada ratified the MoU on Host Nation 
Support (HNS) in March 2004 to guarantee assistance for all Allied forces operating in 
Ukraine.  For NATO, these two agreements represented significant progress in 
“strengthening [Ukrainian] defense and military cooperation with NATO.”125   
Over the last year, Ukrainian airlift assets assisted with military and humanitarian 
NATO airlifts to Afghanistan, Iraq, and Darfur in addition to flights that supported 
Pakistani earthquake relief, and Hurricane Katrina relief.  In fact, worldwide demand for 
Ukrainian heavy lift assets has been so extraordinary over the last few years that Antonov 
is planning to build up to 80 additional An-124s and may complete production of the 
second An-225 by way of an aviation consortium with Russia.126 
2. Setbacks 
However, there have been setbacks with Ukrainian strategic airlift support for 
NATO.  First, a Cypriot company named TMR Energy Ltd sued the Ukrainian State 
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Property Fund for $42.3 million over oil refinery debts.  A Stockholm court upheld the 
suit in 2002 and ruled that TMR could seize Ukrainian state assets as collateral in the 
case.  NATO members from the United States, Canada, France, Belgium, Germany, and 
the Netherlands formally recognized the court ruling and two of Antonov Airlines An-
124 aircraft were subsequently confiscated during stopovers in Canada and Belgium in 
2003.  Ironically, both incidents occurred during contract flights for NATO.127  These 
seizures crippled Antonov and severely limited the ability of Ukrainian assets to fly to 
certain NATO countries.  In response, NATO directed Ukrainian charters out of other 
NATO countries like Turkey or leased Russian airlift assets (that refuse to fly to Iraq) to 
move cargo from the countries in question.  Fortunately for NATO and Ukraine, the 
lawsuit was resolved on November 1, 2005, and Ukraine resumed its direct lift services to 
the NATO countries in question.128   
The second problem deals with the MoU on Strategic Lift.  Although President 
Kuchma signed the agreement with NATO in 2004, the Verkhovna Rada failed to ratify 
the MoU legislation in November 2005.  Parties that opposed President Yushchenko in 
the Verkhovna Rada joined forces to reject the legislation.  This will not keep Ukraine 
from leasing assets to NATO, but it stalls the long-term agreement with Ukraine that 
NATO was pursuing.  There is a chance that the Verkhovna Rada will readdress the 
legislation in 2005, but the MoU will likely have to wait until after the March 2006 
Parliamentary Elections for another vote.  However, if Ukraine becomes a NATO 
member, these assets would be available for extensive NATO use.129 
Incidentally, strategic airlift is also a point of important cooperation between 
Ukraine and the European Union.  Among other points, Headline Goal 2010 outlines the 
Union’s strategic airlift deficiencies within the Union that its CFSP requires to deploy 
European forces outside of Europe.  Until the completion of the A400M at the end of the 
decade, the Union will need airlift support for these tasks.  In fact, the EU needed 
Ukrainian assets for strategic airlift during Operation Artemis in Congo.  As a result, 
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airlift cooperation is addressed in the EU-Ukraine Action Plan, and the heavy airlift 
assets are Ukrainian bargaining tools with the EU as well.130 
D. THE DEMOCRATIC EMBRACE 
The third and most important reason why NATO will open the door for Ukraine 
centers on the nature of the peaceful democratic Orange Revolution.  Although NATO is 
primarily a security institution committed to collective defense, the Alliance has 
transformed into an expanding collection of states focused on the principles of democracy 
and stability in Europe.  This section explains the positive ramifications of the democratic 
Orange Revolution on Euro-Atlantic integration in two parts.  First, it will examine 
NATO literature and explain why the democratic gains in Ukraine augment NATO’s 
principles.  Second, it reveals the two powerful allies within NATO that support 
Ukraine’s democratic gains and Euro-Atlantic aspirations. 
1. NATO Literature 
Ukraine is ultimately eligible for NATO membership under Article 10 of the 
Washington Treaty, which declares that, by unanimous consent, NATO members can 
invite other European states that further NATO principles and “contribute to the security 
of the North Atlantic area to accede to the Treaty.”131  In the opinion of Secretary-
General Scheffer, “Ukraine has shown on a number of occasions that it is a producer and 
exporter, rather than a mere consumer of security – that it plays a significant role in 
maintaining peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic area and beyond.”132  Although 
Article 10 lays out general requirements for accession, the 1995 Study on NATO 
Enlargement, the 1999 Strategic Concept, and the 1999 Membership Action Plan all 
provide additional guidance on the enlargement process.   
The 1995 Study on NATO Enlargement was the first official publication to tackle 
the notion of post-Cold War expansion to the East.  Among its many facets, the document 
focuses on “encouraging and supporting democratic reforms” and “reinforcing the 
tendency toward integration and cooperation in Europe based on shared democratic 
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values.”  In harmony with the Preamble to the North Atlantic Treaty, the first “Principle 
of Enlargement” in the study states that enlargement should help to promote “the 
principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law.”  The study also 
recognizes the significance of the NATO-Russia relationship for European stability, but 
flatly rejects the notion of a Russian veto over any NATO enlargement decisions – even 
Ukraine.  Although Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic were ultimately the only 
states invited to join NATO during the first round of talks in 1997, the study proclaims 
that NATO’s door should never close to qualified European states.133   
In 1999, NATO released its new Strategic Concept at the Washington Summit 
shortly after the accession of Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic.  This document 
declares that NATO “has an indispensable role to play in consolidating and preserving 
the positive changes of the recent past, and in meeting current and future security 
challenges.”  In terms of expansion, the concept states, “[NATO] expects to extend 
further invitations in coming years to nations willing and able to assume the 
responsibilities and obligations of membership, and as NATO determines that the 
inclusion of these nations would serve the overall political and strategic interests of the 
Alliance, strengthen its effectiveness and cohesion, and enhance overall European 
security and stability.”   
Similar to the 1995 study, the Strategic Concept also declares, “No European 
democratic country whose admission would fulfill the objectives of the Treaty will be 
excluded from consideration.”134  The Strategic Concept even explicitly addresses 
Ukraine:  “Ukraine occupies a special place in the Euro-Atlantic security environment 
and is an important and valuable partner in promoting stability and common democratic 
values.”  Additionally, it reiterates the significance of Ukrainian “democratic 
development” on European security and stability.135  
To compliment the Strategic Concept and incorporate the lessons learned during 
the first round of enlargement, NATO also produced the 1999 Membership Action Plan 
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(MAP) document in order to “further enlargement by putting into place a programme of 
activities to assist aspiring countries in their preparations for possible future 
membership.”136  The document’s five main chapters focus on Political and Economic 
issues, Defence/Military issues, Resource issues, Security issues, and Legal issues.   
Ukraine even modeled its 2002 NATO-Ukraine Action Plan along the same lines of the 
MAP.  These primary sources make it clear the democratic gains in Ukraine augment 
NATO’s principles, but NATO is still a security alliance.  In the end, membership criteria 
are largely political, subjective, and based on NATO’s best strategic interests.137   
2. Ukraine’s Champions 
To assist with the political aspect, Ukraine also has two powerful allies within the 
Alliance that support Ukrainian democracy and renewed integration efforts: the United 
States and Poland.  This does not imply that other NATO members do not support the 
Ukrainian cause, but support from the United States and Poland is particularly 
noteworthy and will be instrumental for accession.  Why are these two countries taking a 
special interest in Ukraine? 
a. The United States 
First, the United States has long supported improvements for Ukrainian 
sovereignty and democracy.  As the single largest state and strongest political player in 
the Alliance, the United States has significant leverage within NATO.  Though the 
United States was a slow to recognize Ukraine and initially adopted a policy of “Russia 
First” in Eastern Europe, eventual Ukrainian cooperation during nuclear reduction talks 
earned Ukraine important praise, political capital, and security guarantees from the 
United States.138  In fact, the 1997 National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States 
repeatedly referred to Ukraine by name and called on NATO to “create an enhanced 
NATO-Ukraine relationship” in a larger effort to strengthen “Europe’s east.”139 
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As with NATO, the events surrounding Kosovo and Kuchmagate muddied 
the bilateral relationship between Ukraine and the United States; however, Ukraine 
reemerged as a solid supporter of the United States and the GWOT by joining the 
“coalition of the willing” after September 11, 2001.  Ukraine allowed for U.S. military 
overflight of Ukrainian territory during the early days of Operation Enduring Freedom 
(OEF) and ultimately supplied aid to the Afghan National Army for the NATO-led 
International Security assistance Force (ISAF).  However, the repeated corruption within 
Kuchma Administration eventually led to Ukraine fatigue in the United States, too.   
After evidence surfaced regarding the alleged sale of four advanced 
Kolchuga Radars from Ukraine to Iraq became public, the United States rebuked Kuchma 
and immediately suspended a $55 million-a-year aid program for Ukraine.140  To salvage 
relations with the United States., President Kuchma deployed over 1,600 troops to Iraq in 
order to assist with decontamination and stabilization efforts during Operation Iraqi 
Freedom (OIF).  President Bush has praised Ukrainian forces for their efforts in Iraq, but 
relations remained irreparably strained under Kuchma. As of November 30, 2005, 
Ukraine had reported 18 deaths in Iraq – the fourth largest casualty rate behind the United 
States, Great Britain, and Italy – and Yushchenko was fulfilling his campaign promise to 
bring the Ukrainian troops home from Iraq.141  
After the Orange Revolution, the United States was quick to support 
Yushchenko and the democratic gains in Ukraine.  The 2002 NSS of the United States 
provides important insight into why.  Although this NSS does not mention Ukraine by 
name, it declares that the U.S. will “advance freedom” and “support those who struggle 
non-violently for it, ensuring that nations moving towards democracy are rewarded for 
the steps they take.”  Two years after the publications of this NSS, Ukraine embodied the 
Bush Administration’s commitment to spread democracy and freedom throughout the 
globe.  In terms of NATO, the NSS even states that the United States will “expand 
NATO’s membership to those democratic nations willing and able to share the burden of 
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defending and advancing our common interests.”142  President Bush expounded on both 
points at a press conference during President Yushchenko’s visit to the White House in 
April 2005:  
President Yushchenko was the first head of state I called after my [January 
2005] inaugural address.  I told him that the Orange Revolution was a 
power example – an example of democracy for people around the world.  
…I’m a supporter of the idea of Ukraine becoming a member of NATO.  I 
think it’s important.  …[The United States] want to help your government 
make the difficult decisions and difficult choices necessary to become 
available for membership in NATO.143 
In addition to the White House, the U.S. Congress supports the Ukrainian 
cause.  Within days of Yushchenko’s inauguration, both the House and Senate passed 
concurrent resolutions stating that Congress “commends the people and Government of 
Ukraine for their commitment to democracy.”  More importantly, Congress pledged to 
assist with “Ukraine’s full integration into the international community of 
democracies.”144  Therefore, it is no surprise that Yushchenko even mentioned NATO 
during his speech before a joint session of the U.S. Congress in Washington, DC:   
My goal is to place Ukraine in the forefront of prosperous democracies.  
My vision is Ukraine in a united Europe. …Ukraine wishes to guarantee 
security to its citizens, to live in peace and accord with all of its neighbors, 
whether in the East or in the West.  It is only logical that we target our 
efforts toward the integration into NATO, the alliance that plays an 
essential role in securing peace and stability across the European 
continent.145   
Over and above declarative support for democracy and Euro-Atlantic 
integration, Congress increased U.S. aid to Ukraine by $60 million and the Senate voted 
in November 2005 to graduate Ukraine from the Jackson-Vanik Amendment.  Passed in 
1974 to punish the Soviet Union and other non-market states for limiting religious 
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immigration, this amendment still hinders normal trade relations between the United 
States and Ukraine.  It may also help Ukraine with its WTO ambitions.  Though the 
House of Representatives still must vote to repeal the amendment, the end of Jackson-
Vanik will help Ukraine economically by fostering new trade with the United States.146  
As a token of appreciation for U.S. support, Yushchenko unilaterally eliminated visa 
requirements for United States citizens traveling to Ukraine. 
Though the United States is willing to use its significant influence in 
NATO to support Ukraine’s democracy and Euro-Atlantic integration, the U.S. has less 
sway in mainland Europe, especially after the trans-Atlantic rift that developed over the 
Iraq war.  Fortunately, Ukraine also has a powerful European champion. 
b. Poland 
The second powerful ally for Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic endeavor is Poland.  
Poland supports Ukrainian freedom and democracy, but for different rationale than the 
United States.  Poland and Ukraine share almost 330 miles of common border and 
Ukraine remains a key component of Poland’s security strategy.  Fourteen years after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, Poland still views an independent Ukraine as a critical 
barrier from corrosive Russian influence.  Consequently, Poland has emerged as “the 
major advocate of efforts to anchor Ukraine” in the West.147 
Poland was the first country to recognize Ukrainian independence, and the 
two countries signed the “Treaty on Good Neighborliness, Friendly Relations, and 
Cooperation” less than six months after the Soviet collapse.  Though Poland occasionally 
put aside its relationship with Ukraine in order to pursue its own Western agenda, the two 
neighbors ultimately forged many important political, military, and economic ties.  One 
of these ties is Polish-Ukrainian Battalion (POLUKRBAT).  Formed in 1995, the 
POLUKRBAT is a joint peacekeeping battalion that has deployed to Kosovo and Iraq to 
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assist with peacekeeping operations.  As a result, POLUKRBAT has become an 
important link between Poland, Ukraine, and NATO.148 
After lobbying hard for initial NATO expansion in 1995 and acceding into 
the Alliance during its first enlargement in 1999, Poland has emerged as the center of 
NATO’s eastern wing and the regional advocate for enlargement in Eastern Europe with 
its own ostpolitik.149  Additionally, Poland joined the EU in 2004, and Poland is gaining 
important political and economic influence within in the Union.  As a result, Poland has 
noteworthy influence in both primary Western institutions that will help Ukraine with its 
European and Euro-Atlantic ambitions. 
The Orange Revolution was significant for Polish-Ukrainian relations for 
at least two reasons.  First, it presented an opportunity to anchor a democratic and 
reform-minded government in Ukraine.  Poland views Ukrainian freedom as a “Polish 
mission.”  Though Poland tried to support Western reforms in Ukraine under President 
Kuchma, the outlook is much better now, under Yushchenko.  In addition, Poland has 
much to lose if Yushchenko fizzles.  If Ukrainian democracy retreats, Russian influence 
may creep back into Ukraine and damage Polish political, economic, and security 
interests.  Second, Poland viewed the Orange Revolution as the Ukrainian version of 
“Solidarity.”  In fact, former Polish President and Solidarity leader Lech Walesa even 
traveled to Ukraine during the early days of the Orange Revolution to provide important 
political and moral support for Yushchenko.150   
NATO’s overriding democratic principles and enlargement doctrine 
indicate that the Alliance will continue to support the new democratic gains in Ukraine 
following the Orange Revolution, and the resolute political support of these principles in 
Ukraine from the United States and Poland will facilitate Ukraine with its plans for Euro-
Atlantic integration.  A solid democracy in Ukraine will anchor democratic values in 
Eastern Europe and may even influence positive reforms and cooperation in Moldova, 
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Russia, and Belarus.  In fact, the Belarusian defense minister affirmed in November 2005 
that his country is ready to expand its cooperation with NATO within the framework of 
PfP.151  This is quite significant considering the authoritarian regime of Alexander 
Lukashenko stifled previous attempts at Westernization and has commonly referred to 
NATO, EU, and the U.S. as external enemies of Belarus152   
E. SINCE THE REVOLUTION 
In the months since Yushchenko’s inauguration, the relationship between NATO 
and Ukraine has improved dramatically.  First, Ukraine and NATO established a new PfP 
Trust Fund project aimed at destroying an estimated 133,000 tons of excess munitions 
and 1.5 million small arms, light weapons, and Man-Portable Air Defense Systems 
(MANPADS) located in Ukraine.153  Next, Ukraine volunteered to participate in 
Operation Active Endeavour, NATO’s Article 5 mission aimed at detecting and deterring 
terrorist activity in the Mediterranean.  Most importantly, NATO agreed to launch an 
Intensified Dialogue (ID) with Ukraine. 
1. Intensified Dialogue 
The general purpose of the ID is to address important issues specified in the 1995 
Study on NATO Enlargement, and it is apparent from the Ukrainian discourse that 
NATO is starting to open the door for Ukrainian membership into the Alliance.  
However, the ID does not imply that NATO will begin membership talks with Ukraine.  
Ukraine’s ID outlined the following categories for urgent short-term reform: 
- Strengthening democratic institutions (four initiatives) 
 
- Renewing political dialogue (five initiatives) 
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- Enhancing and targeting public diplomacy efforts (five initiatives) 
 
- Enhancing support to address the socio-economic impact of defense 
 reform (six initiatives)154 
Ukraine must still implement many of the political, economic, and security 
reforms outlined in the Action Plan and the ID initiatives before it is prepared for 
accession into NATO.  However, the “NATO umbrella” will help consolidate recent 
democratic gains and recognize the important Ukrainian contributions to Euro-Atlantic 
security and stability through non-proliferation, cooperation, and common values.155 
More recently, the NUC held its October 2005 meeting in Kyiv to deepen the 
relationship and to help bolster the NATO image in Ukraine.  During the NUC meeting, 
Secretary-General Scheffer continued to affirm that NATO is open for Ukraine as long as 
Ukraine continues to pursue democratic commitments and reforms.  He stated that NATO 
should be a priority for Ukraine in order to anchor values, promote positive reforms, and 
bolster common security.  Scheffer also placed strong emphasis on the March 2006 
Parliamentary Elections as the next important benchmark for democracy in Ukraine and 
the NATO relationship.156  Following the NUC summit, the Ukrainian Intensified 
Dialogue reconvened in Vilnius on October 23, 2005, to discuss the future of Ukrainian 
defense and security sector reforms.   
2. Membership Action Plan? 
The next formal step in the accession pipeline for Ukraine will be the NATO 
Membership Action Plan (MAP).  The MAP is a “practical manifestation of the Open 
Door” that helps aspiring countries prepare for accession, but it does not imply a time 
frame or a guarantee for membership.  Three countries have joined the MAP and are 
currently in the queue for NATO enlargement.  These countries are the Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Croatia, and Albania.  Macedonia and Albania agreed 
to MAPs with NATO in 1999, and Croatia joined the MAP in 2002.  How does Ukraine 
compare to these MAP countries?   
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Ukraine compares fairly well in basic measurements of democracy, economy, and 
defense when compared to the NATO MAP states.157  First, Ukrainian democracy is 
improving.  The previous chapter discussed the Freedom House gains after the Orange 
Revolution, and the following chart shows the 2005 Freedom House rating for each 
country as well as its rating at the time it joined the NATO MAP.  Freedom House rates 
Political Rights (PR) and Civil Liberties (CL) on a scale of “1” (best) to “7” (worst), and 








Albania 4, 5 PF 3, 3 PF 
Croatia 2, 2 F 2, 2 F 
Macedonia 3, 3 PF 3, 3 PF 
Ukraine -- 4, 3 PF 
Source:  Freedom House 
Table 2. Comparison of Freedom House Ratings 
 
Ukraine also had serious problems with corruption under the Kuchma 
Administration, but new ratings from Transparency International (TI) show that the 
Corruption Perception Index (CPI) for Ukraine improved after the Orange Revolution.158  
These corruption scores are based on a scale of “0” (worst) to “10” (best).  Ukraine’s 
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Country MAP 2005 
Albania 2.3 2.4 
Croatia 3.8 3.4 
Macedonia 3.3 2.7 
Ukraine -- 2.6 
Source:  Transparency International 
Table 3. Comparison of Corruption Ratings 
 
Two other important figures for NATO gauge economic development and defense 
spending.  Until this year, Ukraine had one of the hottest economies in Europe, with GDP 
growing at a rate of over 12 percent during 2004.  After the Orange Revolution, however, 
the Ukrainian economy has actually slowed its growth to around five percent.  Based on 
information from the World Bank, this table shows GDP in billions of dollars and shows 
percent change over the previous year since 2000.159  To help put the figures in context, 
Ukraine has a population of 46 million people, Croatia has 4.5 million people, Albania 
has 3.6 million people, and Macedonia has 2 million.160 
 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Albania(GDP $B) $3.694 $4.103 $4.502 $5.705 $7.590 
(% change) 7.3 7.6 4.7 6 6.2 
Croatia $18.427 $19.863 $22.812 $28.810 $34.200 
 2.86 4.44 5.21 4.27 3.7 
Macedonia $3.587 $3.437 $3.791 $4.666 $5.246 
 4.55 -4.53 0.85 3.23 2.5 
Ukraine $31.262 $38.009 $42.393 $50.133 $65.149 
 5.9 9.2 5.2 9.4 12.1 
Source: The World Bank 
Table 4. Comparison of GDP 
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From this GDP, NATO is interested in how much each country spends on 
defense.  NATO advocates spending 3 percent of GDP on defense spending.  Ukraine 
still has a Soviet-type legacy defense structure, and in his 2004 analysis, Leonid 
Polyakov stated that Ukraine was still years away from a modern force that could fully 
integrate with the West.  However, NATO continues to assist Ukraine with defense 
reforms via the JWGDR in order to streamline and modernize the Ukrainian forces.161  
According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Ukraine 
spent 2.9 percent of GDP on Military Expenditures in 2003 ($1.429 billion).162  Despite 
increasing defense spending by 8 percent, the 2004 figures place defense spending at the 
2.4 percent of GDP based defense spending of $1.553 billion.  
 
Country MAP 2004 
Albania 1.2% 1.0% 
Croatia 2.4% 2.4% 
Macedonia 1.8% 2.3% 
Ukraine -- 2.4% 
Source:  SIPRI / World Bank 
Table 5. Comparison of Defense Spending 
 
So how close is Ukraine to joining the MAP?  Though Ukraine still needs reforms 
in critical areas outlined in the ID, it appears to parallel the basic ratings of other MAP 
countries.  This does not necessarily mean that Ukraine will accede to the MAP process 
anytime soon.  The process remains highly subjective and open to interpretation by 
NATO. 
F. CONCLUSION 
For NATO, the 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine presented an opportunity to 
deepen the NATO-Ukraine relationship and consolidate the democratic gains in Ukraine 
and beyond.  Although Ukraine declared its intention to join NATO in May 2002, 
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political corruption and empty rhetoric during the Kuchma Administration hindered the 
possibility of Euro-Atlantic integration.  In spite of political shortcomings, significant 
military cooperation and consultation between NATO and Ukraine over the course of the 
thirteen-year relationship shaped a solid foundation for the future of the partnership.  In 
fact, Ukraine is already a proven asset for NATO security tasks and crisis response 
operations in line with the Alliance’s new Strategic Concept.  Ukraine also offers NATO 
a prime geopolitical position between Europe and Asia and crucial strategic airlift 
capability that augments Alliance shortfalls. 
Most importantly, the Orange Revolution and democratic election of Yushchenko 
supplied the missing political element needed to spur future integration opportunities.  
NATO’s overriding democratic principles and enlargement doctrine commanded a strong 
response from NATO to assist Yushchenko.  NATO’s door is now open for Ukraine, and 
western reforms in Ukraine may even elicit democratic changes with Ukraine’s Eastern 
neighbors.  With significant support from the United States and Poland, Ukraine will 
receive the important political backing it needs to accede into the Alliance. Ukraine’s 
inability to join the EU in the short-term also puts pressure on NATO to integrate 
Ukraine into the Euro-Atlantic community and stabilize the fledgling Ukrainian 
democracy.163 
On the path of progress, NATO recently implemented an Intensified Dialogue in 
order to foster the reforms necessary for future Euro-Atlantic integration.  Ukraine also 
ranks well among the MAP countries in NATO, and Ukraine may join the MAP in the 
near future.  However, there are additional challenges associated with Ukrainian Euro-
Atlantic integration that further complicate this dilemma.  Ukraine must still follow 
through with wide-ranging reforms inline with the ID.  Without them, Ukrainian 
European and Euro-Atlantic integration is all but improbable.  Ukraine also faces difficult 
decisions at home and in its own “near abroad” concerning NATO membership.  The 
next chapter outlines the obstacles that may impede Ukrainian integration efforts. 
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IV. OBSTACLES TO NATO (AND EUROPEAN) INTEGRATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses the final piece of the European and Euro-Atlantic 
integration dilemma for Ukraine.  Although NATO appears prepared to open its door for 
Ukraine in the near future and help pave the way for possible integration into other 
European structures, there are still considerable obstacles to NATO integration that may 
prevent Ukraine from achieving its goals.  This chapter examines three of these issues.  
First, Russia does not support Ukraine’s bid for NATO membership.  Russia remains 
Ukraine’s “eternal strategic partner,” and Moscow still yields considerable political, 
economic, and security leverage over Kyiv.  Second, the notion of NATO membership is 
not popular among most Ukrainians and promises of a public referendum over accession 
could scuttle Yushchenko’s NATO ambitions.  Third, the Yushchenko Administration is 
losing valuable momentum in Ukraine and the Verkhovna Rada is working against 
certain necessary reforms.   
B. RUSSIA  
The first of Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic constraints is Russia.  The connections 
between Ukraine and Russia are already well documented, and President Yushchenko 
reaffirmed that Russia remains Ukraine’s “strategic partner” during the February 2005 
NUC summit in Brussels.164  However, Yushchenko also noted, “it is important that our 
relations with the East do not block our path to Europe.”165 
In terms of Russia and NATO, the relationship has improved over the past 
fourteen years, and the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act summarizes the basis for the 
formal relationship between NATO and Russia:  
NATO and Russia do not consider each other as adversaries.  They share 
the goal of overcoming the vestiges of earlier confrontation and 
competition and of strengthening mutual trust and cooperation.  The 
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 present Act affirms the determination of NATO and Russia to give 
concrete substance to their shared commitment to build a stable, peaceful 
and undivided Europe.166 
Despite this agreement and previous rhetoric from President Putin that condoned 
Ukraine’s NATO membership aspirations in 2002, Russia has been very apprehensive 
about Ukrainian Euro-Atlantic integration.167  During the initial round of NATO 
enlargement, Russia strongly opposed the notion of expansion into its sphere of 
influence.  For Russia, the geopolitical situation in Europe remains a “zero-sum” game, 
by which any gains by the West constitute a loss of Russian security and prestige.  Russia 
even proposed drawing “horizontal red lines” to limit the scope of NATO enlargement.  
In fact, Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov lobbied against NATO expansion 
and warned NATO in 1996 that Russia would not accept Ukraine and the Baltic States 
joining the Alliance.168   
In spite of stern Russian objections to NATO enlargement into former Soviet 
territory, NATO crossed Russia’s proscriptive horizontal red line with the accession of all 
three Baltic States in 2004 without incident, and NATO continues to emphasize that 
Alliance decisions – including enlargement – “cannot be subject to any veto or droit de 
regard by a non-member state.”169  Though Russia has no formal veto over Alliance 
enlargement, Russian influence in Ukraine may ultimately hinder its membership 
aspirations.   
1. The Black Sea Fleet 
The first of these obstacles is the BSF.  Russia continues to house its Black Sea 
Fleet in Sevastopol.  Although the Ukrainian constitution essentially limits the longevity 
of the Russian fleet agreement to 2017, there is come evidence to suggest that Ukraine 
now wants the BSF to vacate Sevastopol early.170  However, this could re-ignite a very 
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contentious debate in the Crimea.  As Anatol Lieven explains, “Sevastopol is perhaps the 
only place outside Russia for which one can imagine many ordinary Russians willingly 
going to war.”171  Homeporting the Russian fleet on prospective NATO territory could 
also lead to tribulation within the Alliance, but for the time being, the question of the BSF 
officially remains a non-issue for NATO.  According to Secretary General Scheffer, 
“NATO does not have an official position [about the Black Sea fleet].  The Black Sea 
fleet problem is the bilateral problem between Ukraine and Russia.  NATO will not enter 
this discussion.”172 
2. Single Economic Space 
Second, the Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada ratified the CIS “Single Economic Space” 
between Ukraine, Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan in April 2004.  The SES remains very 
secretive, and the text of the agreement has not been made public in Ukraine or the other 
signatory countries.  According to reports, the SES forms a free-trade zone and customs 
union between the states.  In addition, it creates deep political and economic coordination 
between the countries.  Surprisingly, President Kuchma signed the agreement with 
certain reservations about provisions that contradict the Ukrainian Constitution, and the 
Verkhovna Rada apparently ratified the agreement without knowing the full scope of the 
document.173 
This mysterious political and economic union will almost certainly conflict with 
the future of European integration.  As a result, the Yushchenko Administration is 
already looking for ways to scuttle the CIS Single Economic Space plan in favor of a 
more subdued free-trade zone that will not interfere with European, Euro-Atlantic, or 
WTO integration.174  
3. Energy 
The third obstacle for Ukraine is its dependence on Russia for energy and other 
economic trade.  As was previously discussed, Russia supplies more than three-quarters 
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of Ukrainian energy imports and remains Ukraine’s single largest trading partner.  
Consequently, Russia possesses important economic leverage over Ukraine.  Critical 
Russian oil and natural gas pipelines run through Ukrainian territory and into Europe.  As 
compensation for the pipeline, Russia currently provides energy to Ukraine at a reduced 
rate.  However, Moscow is looking to scrap the current barter system in order to raise 
Ukrainian rates for energy.  In one example, Russia has proposed raising the Ukrainian 
rate on natural gas from approximately $50 per thousand cubic meters to the European 
price of an estimated $160 in 2006.175  This three-fold increase would deal a severe blow 
to the Ukrainian economy and represent a significant loss for Yushchenko.  Russian 
officials have indicated that this shift is in response to Ukraine’s new foreign and security 
policy agenda.  In the words of Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov, “Russia will 
have to revise relations with Ukraine and not necessarily in the area of security.”176   
Though NATO integration will help consolidate the recent democratic gains in 
Ukraine, Ukrainian membership may upset the security and stability in Eastern Europe 
and weaken the NATO and Ukrainian relationships with Russia.  However, Ukraine 
cannot simply disregard Russia.  Though Russia may not physically block Ukrainian 
NATO aspirations, Russia is prepared to use its economic and political instruments of 
national power to keep Ukraine within its sphere of influence.  As a result, Ukraine must 
find a novel way to strike a balance with Russia while simultaneously wooing NATO and 
implementing Western reforms.   
C. PUBLIC OPINION 
The second predicament concerning future NATO membership centers on the fact 
that NATO, as an institution, is not popular in Ukraine.  In a February 2005 opinion poll, 
only 15 percent of Ukrainians surveyed supported the idea of joining NATO, even after 
Yushchenko’s inauguration.  By contrast, 44 percent supported EU membership.177  Even 
more stunning is the fact that NATO’s popularity numbers are dropping after the Orange 
Revolution.  In December 2003, 31 percent supported membership, but the number 
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dropped to 27 percent in May 2004 before falling again after the 2004 election.178  
Strikingly, 24 percent of Ukrainians that did not support NATO membership still viewed 
the Alliance as an “aggressive imperialistic bloc.”179 
Prior to the Orange Revolution, public opinion had little effect on foreign policy 
decisions in Ukraine.  One study argues that foreign policy in Ukraine is largely “elite 
driven” and public opinion is characteristically of “minimal importance.”180  However, 
under pressure from political opposition, President Yushchenko vowed to decide 
decisions like NATO and EU membership “exclusively through a referendum.”181  As a 
result, low public opinion may ultimately scuttle NATO membership aspirations 
(ironically) by means of a democratic referendum.   
This raises another question.  Why do Ukrainians have such a low opinion of 
NATO?  Studies show that an overwhelming majority of the Ukrainian public is poorly 
informed about the Alliance and views NATO as a Cold War relic.  Only ten percent of 
those surveyed even know what NATO stands for and what it offers Ukraine.182  
Consequently, NATO is trying to boost its public image in Ukraine by a variety of 
methods.  First, NATO has an Information and Document Center in Kyiv that supplies 
Ukrainian citizens with information and publications about the alliance.  Second, NATO 
Secretary General Scheffer gave a speech entitled “Why NATO?” at the National 
University of Kyiv that outlined the purpose and benefits of the NATO partnership for 
Ukraine during the October 2005 NUC summit in Ukraine.  In addition, NATO deployed 
Ambassadors across Ukraine to conduct seminars and host information activities about 
the Alliance.  Finally, NATO engaged a group of popular Ukrainian celebrities to help 
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 promote the Alliance and break down Cold War stereotypes.183  Clearly, changing the 
perception of the Alliance in Ukraine will be key aspect to NATO integration if the issue 
goes before a public referendum. 
D. LOSING MOMENTUM? 
The third obstacle pivots on recent developments in Ukraine that indicate that the 
Orange Revolution coalition is faltering.  On September 8, 2005, President Yushchenko 
dismissed Prime Minister Yulia Tymoschenko and much of her government amid 
allegations of infighting and renewed corruption.184  Yushchenko nominated Yuiry 
Yekhanurov to replace Tymoschenko later in the month, but Yushchenko ran into 
difficulties getting Yekhanurov approved by the Verkhovna Rada.  Consequently, 
Yushchenko made certain concessions and signed the “Memorandum of Understanding 
between the Government and the Opposition” with his archrival, Victor Yanukovich, in 
order to pass Yekhanurov’s nomination.185  Compounding the difficulties for 
Yushchenko, he will forfeit a significant amount of power to the Verkhovna Rada on 
January 1, 2006, when provisions agreed to during the December election standoff take 
effect.   
The next major political test for Yushchenko and Euro-Atlantic integration will 
occur during the March 2006 Parliamentary Elections.  If a clearly democratic and pro-
NATO Ukraine emerges from the parliamentary elections, NATO may open the door 
even further for Ukraine in order to “further the principles of [the Washington] 
Treaty.”186  However, a current opinion poll shows that Yushchenko’s “Our Ukraine 
People’s Party” without the support of the Yulia Tymoschenko bloc is very vulnerable.  
In fact, Yanukovich and his Party of Regions may very well win the most seats of any 
party in the Verkhovna Rada.187  This outcome could further stifle Euro-Atlantic 
integration efforts by continuing to block necessary reform efforts. 
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E. CONCLUSION 
Though NATO is willing to foster reforms in Ukraine and champion 
Yushchenko’s European integration efforts, there are serious obstacles for integration.  
Russia will not let Ukraine go without a fight.  However, NATO cannot acknowledge a 
“Russian veto” over enlargement due to that fact that even implicit exclusion from 
NATO would relegate Ukraine into the Russian “sphere of influence.”188   
NATO’s image in Ukraine remains dismal, but efforts are being made by 
Yushchenko and NATO to improve the image problem.  However, Yushchenko’s 
momentum is waning, and the 2006 elections will be a significant test for Yushchenko, 
his Euro-Atlantic integration efforts, and Ukrainian democracy as a whole.  
Consequently, the onus is once again on Ukraine to overcome these obstacles to 
integration by making difficult choices, and implementing difficult reforms to become 
truly “European.”   
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V. CONCLUSIONS 
A. THE NEW DILEMMA 
On November 22, 2005, Victor Yushchenko delivered another speech to tens of 
thousands of Ukrainians gathered in Kyiv’s Independence Square.  The purpose of this 
speech was to celebrate the first anniversary of the start of the Orange Revolution.189  In 
the preceding twelve months (ten as President), Yushchenko dramatically changed the 
nature of Ukrainian democracy and altered the course of European and Euro-Atlantic 
integration.  This thesis outlined these changes and explored the new dilemma that has 
emerged as a result of Yushchenko’s strategic goal of “Ukraine in a United Europe.”  
Until the Orange Revolution and subsequent election of Yushchenko, the 
prospects of Ukrainian integration into the EU or NATO were all but improbable.  The 
Kuchma Administration employed a non-aligned “multi-vector” foreign policy to balance 
developed Eastern influences in Russia with the novel Western influences in Europe and 
North America.  Although Ukraine officially abandoned its “multi-vector” policy in favor 
of “European Choice” in 2002, the declarations endorsing Western integration were 
largely rhetorical, and Ukraine never committed to significant reforms.  Additionally, 
corruptive politics formed a semi-authoritarian hybrid democracy in Ukraine.  This 
combination was unacceptable for the EU and NATO, and ultimately led to a diplomatic 
condition in the West termed “Ukraine fatigue.” 
Now, the real difficulty following the Orange Revolution is that Ukraine is 
serious about democracy and European integration.  At this juncture, the EU has not 
endorsed an accession dialogue with Ukraine because it does not meet the requirements 
needed to accede into the EU, and the Union is not prepared politically or economically 
to absorb Ukraine.  Therefore, Yushchenko has focused on NATO integration as an 
alternate way to “Europeanize.”  From the early days of Partnership for Peace, NATO 
and Ukraine have shared a surprisingly cooperative history and Ukraine augments NATO 
with important defense capabilities like strategic airlift.  Most importantly, the progress 
of democracy in Ukraine as a result of the 2004 Presidential Election and Orange 
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Revolution are harmonious with NATO’s founding principles of democracy, individual 
liberty, and the rule of law.  Consequently, NATO adopted an Intensified Dialogue in its 
overt “Open Door” policy towards Ukraine, and Ukraine will use NATO membership as 
an institutional stepping-stone on the way to EU membership similar to its western 
neighbors in Poland, Romania, and Hungary.   
However, NATO accession is by no means guaranteed to Ukraine.  Russia is 
opposed to the notion of Euro-Atlantic accession, NATO remains unpopular among the 
Ukrainian public, and Ukraine must implement critical reforms to meet NATO accession 
standards.  Ukraine’s European dilemma is further complicated by the reality that without 
NATO, the West is again closed for Ukraine and even a democratic and post-revolution 
Ukraine faces relegation to Russia by default.190   
Long after Zbigniew Brzezinski identified Ukraine as a “geopolitical pivot” based 
on its important geographic location and innate vulnerability to the Great Powers, 
Ukraine remains vitally important for European and Eurasian security and stability.  
Brzezinski envisaged that with significant domestic reforms and a European identity, 
Ukraine would be ready for serious negotiations with the EU and NATO “between 2005 
and 2010.”191  The 2004 Orange Revolution may be the catalyst to prove him correct, but 
important progress still needs to occur.  The next section will outline some 
recommendations to bolster Ukrainian European and Euro-Atlantic aspirations. 
B. THE WAY AHEAD 
1. Ukraine 
Ukraine faces two vital benchmarks for Western development in the next few 
months that will significantly help or hinder further integration into the EU and NATO.  
First, the WTO will meet in Hong Kong during mid-December 2005 to address the 
Ukrainian bid for membership.  This is important because membership in the WTO will 
help reform the Ukrainian economy and enable the EU to create a free trade area with 
Ukraine.  Without WTO membership, Ukraine may succumb to Russian instruments of 
economic power projection.  Consequently, Ukraine must decide how its “eternal 
strategic partnership” with Russia will look in the future in order to readdress critical 
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obstacles to European and Euro-Atlantic integration posed by the Black Sea Fleet, the 
Single Economic Space, and energy dependency. 
Second, the March 2006 Parliamentary Elections are crucial for both the 
democratic development of Ukraine and its European and Euro-Atlantic aspirations.  The 
elections are also important because Yushchenko will lose more of his consolidated 
Presidential power in January 2006, and the Verkhovna Rada becomes more important 
for the future of integration efforts.  Additionally, the Verkhovna Rada has delivered 
mixed signals about its commitment to the Euro-Atlantic cause by supporting certain 
reforms and spoiling others.  The 2006 elections may lead to stalled reforms if parties 
unfriendly to Western integration succeed, but as long as the democratic process prevails 
without media influence or voter manipulation, it will still be a victory for democratic 
values. 
Ukraine should also leverage its valuable strategic airlift assets with the West.  
Ukraine airlift capability exceeds lift ability in both NATO and the EU, and this 
capability may give Ukraine a valuable tool in future accession debates.  Passing the 
Memorandum of Understanding on Strategic Lift will show that Ukraine is a team player 
and an exporter of security in Europe and beyond. 
Ukrainian European integration options are dependent on NATO accession.  
Therefore, Ukraine must continue to focus on Euro-Atlantic reforms and public relations 
efforts in order to integrate into European political, economic, and security institutions. 
2. NATO 
NATO has been very clear in its Open Door policy towards Ukraine – especially 
since the Orange Revolution.  NATO is not only a security organization; NATO is also a 
collection of democracies focused on keeping the peace. As a result, NATO remains 
obliged by its guiding principles to encourage Ukraine towards the West.  However, 
NATO must continue to demand that new entrants follow Membership Action Plan 
procedures.  Consequently, the notion of a “golden carrot” for immediate accession is a 
bad idea for Ukraine because the government is not ready for it and the people do not 
want it.  NATO has rightfully put the onus for reform back on Ukraine, and thus a steady 
domestic reform process is the best path for Ukraine.  The Intensified Dialogue provides 
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solid guidance for necessary reforms, and NATO should consider a Membership Action 
Plan for Ukraine if the March election is free, fair, and pro-NATO.  This will give 
Ukraine further incentive and guidance for its European endeavors.  In addition, 
Ukraine’s champions in the United States and Poland must continue to provide political 
and economic support for Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations. 
In addition, NATO needs to make Russia comfortable with the idea of Ukrainian 
membership.  Russia is still unprepared for Ukraine to move out of the CIS “near abroad” 
to the “far abroad,” so Ukraine and NATO must continue to profess that the Alliance is 
not a threat to Russian interests.192  Russia will likely continue to influence Ukrainian 
ambitions, but reforms and assistance from the West can help buffer Ukraine from these 
negative effects.  In addition, NATO cannot acknowledge a “Russian veto” over 
enlargement because even implicit exclusion from NATO would relegate Ukraine into 
the Russian “sphere of influence.”193  More importantly, without Euro-Atlantic 
integration, Ukraine risks exclusion from “New Europe” and relegation to Russia.194     
3. The European Union 
Ukrainian accession into the EU will represent the final stage of European 
integration.  The current EU enlargement debate over Turkey and the Balkans will 
impede Ukrainian accession in the short term, but the EU must at least offer a light at the 
end of the long tunnel.  The enhanced EU-Ukraine Action Plan and “market economy 
status” are both promising starts on the path to Europe, but the EU needs to enact a long-
term accession plan with Ukraine.  Yushchenko is making headway towards Europe, but 
in a reversal of misfortune, the continued negligence of the EU to pursue Ukraine may 
lead to “Europe fatigue” in Ukraine.  In the meantime, the EU can assist with meaningful 
economic and political reform efforts.  Europe must help Ukraine accede into the WTO 
and ultimately reduce its economic dependency with Russia – especially in terms of 
energy.  Although European accession is clearly not a near term option, with patience, 
effort, and reform, Ukraine will remain on the path for Yushchenko’s goal of Ukraine in 
a United Europe. 
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